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I. Introduction
Since 1965, the Supreme Court has struggled to reconcile the peremp-
tory challenge' with the dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Pro-
* I wish to thank Professor Allan P. Ides, Michael A. Bosh, and Robert M. Howie
for their helpful suggestions and encouragement in the writing of this Note.
1. See WAYNE R. LAFAvE & JERoLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCE DURE § 22.3(d) (2d
ed. 1992) (defining peremptory challenge). To select a jury for any civil or criminal trial,
state courts and federal district courts select, at random, a certain number of names from a
"jury list" or "jury wheel," which is a complete list of all citizens eligible for jury service
within a court's jurisdiction. Id. § 22.2(a)-(b). This randomly selected group of potential
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tection Clause.2 In J.E.B. v Alabama ex rel. T.B.,3 the Court held that a
state's exercise of peremptory challenges on the basis of sex violates the
Constitution.4 Prior to J.E.B., state prosecutors, 5 civil litigants,6 and crim-
mal defendants7 could not strike a vemre member' based on that member's
race. However, the Court gave no indication m those cases that its rulings
applied beyond the context of race-based peremptory challenges.9
In order to reach a result that Court precedent neither required nor per-
rmtted, the J.E.B. Court adopted novel approaches to both equal protection
jurors is the "vemre" or "jury panel." Id. § 22.2(t). During the next stage, voir dire, the liti-
gants question the venire members to determine which members will serve as trial or "petit"
jurors. Id. § 22.3(a)-(b). Litigants can remove panelists from the venire in one of two ways:
"challenges for cause" and "peremptory challenges" or "peremptory strikes." Id. § 22.3(c)-
(d). Litigants have an unlimited number of challenges for cause with which to strike venire
members on specific grounds of actual bias; however, the litigants must convince the trial
judge that such bias actually exists. Id. § 22.3(c). Conversely, state and federal statutes or
rules of criminal procedure typically limit the number of peremptory challenges, see FED. R.
CRiM. P 24(b) (specifying number of peremptory challenges), but litigants do not have to
justify peremptory strikes. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra, § 22.3(d). But see infra notes 36, 125
and accompanying text (explaining that litigants sometimes must provide race- and sex-neutral
reasons for peremptory challenges). See generally JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION
PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMrTMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS (1977) (dis-
cussing state and federal jury selection procedures).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, m part: "No
State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
Id., see infra notes 154-63 and accompanying text (discussing Court's approach to Equal
Protection Clause); see also infra notes 197-212 and accompanying text (discussing Court's
attempt to balance Equal Protection Clause and peremptory challenges).
3. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
4. J.E.B. v Alabama at rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1430 (1994); see infra notes 100-
49 and accompanying text (discussing J.E.B.).
5. See infra notes 35-41 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's prohibi-
tion of state prosecutors' use of race-based peremptory challenges).
6. See mfra notes 63-71 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's prohibi-
tion of civil litigants' use of race-based peremptory challenges).
7 See infra notes 72-77 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's prohibi-
tion of crimial defendants' use of race-based peremptory challenges).
8. See supra note 1 (defining venire member). For the purposes of this Note, the
terms "venire member," "jury panelist," and "potential juror" are synonymous.
9. See United States v Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038, 1042 (4th Cir. 1988) (explaining
that Court gave no intimation of desire to expand Batson v Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986),
to sex-based peremptory challenges), cert. dismissed sub nom. Washington v United States,
489 U.S. 1094 (1989), and cert. denied 493 U.S. 1069 (1990); see also infra notes 90-99 and




and peremptory challenge case law First, the J.E.B. Court characterized
the state's exercise of peremptory challenges as a sex-based classification by
scrutinizing one party's strikes in a given case.1" In addition, the Court
ignored the historical underpinnings of the previous peremptory challenge
cases and focused on the history of exclusion of women from jury venires"
rather than on discrimination in the exercise of peremptory strikes. 2 This
focus enabled the Court to extend the application of the Equal Protection
Clause in the context of peremptory challenges, historically a special cate-
gory 13 As a result, parties can raise more equal protection clamis against
the exercise of peremptory challenges because the Equal Protection Clause
now governs more individual challenges.14 In the process, the Court
severely abridged an important right.5 The long-term effect of these errors
is that judicial scrutiny of peremptory challenges will increase, 6 and courts
will require explanations where attorneys otherwise would not have to pro-
vide any explanations.' 7 Thus, J.E.B. will have a profound impact upon the
peremptory challenge. Batson v Kentucky - which held that the Equal
Protection Clause governs the exercise of peremptory challenges in an mdi-
vidual case" - wounded the challenge; J.E.B. may effectively eliminate the
peremptory strike.'I
10. See mfra notes 165-80 and accompanying text (criticizing J.E.B. Court's character-
ization of peremptory challenges as sex-based classification).
11. J.E.B. v Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1422-24 (1994).
12. See mfra notes 197-212 and accompanying text (discussing Court's requirement of
persistent abuse in exercise of peremptory challenges to trigger equal protection scrutiny in
individual cases).
13. See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422, 1429 (extending application of Batson to sex-based
peremptory challenges); see also ifra notes 197-212 and accompanying text (discussing
Court's balance between Equal Protection Clause and peremptory strikes).
14. See infra notes 213-30 and accompanying text (arguing that J.E.B. subjects more
peremptory challenges to equal protection scrutiny).
15. See mfra notes 191-94 and accompanying text (discussing importance of peremptory
challenge in system of trial by jury).
16. See J.E.B. v Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1429-30 (1994) (outlining
procedure for evaluating sex-based challenges); see also Denise J. Am, Batson: Beginning
of the End of the Perenptory Challenge?, ARMY LAW., May 1990, at 33, 43 (explaining that
extension of Batson to sex will result in more constitutional challenges to peremptory strikes).
17 See supra note 1 (defining peremptory challenge).
18. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 (1986) (holding that criminal defendant
may raise equal protection claim based on state's use of race-based peremptory challenges);
see also infra notes 35-41 and accompanying text (discussing Batson).
19. See State v Harris, 432 S.E.2d 93, 97 n.2 (W Va. 1993) (stating that extension
of Batson to sex will be death knell for peremptory challenge); Am, supra note 16, at 43
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Part II of this Note provides historical background by reviewing the
Supreme Court peremptory challenge case law prior to J.E.B.ai Part I dis-
cusses the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in J.E.B.21 Part IV
analyzes J.E.B. from the context of equal protection and jury selection cases
and criticizes the J.E.B. Court's approach in both respects.' Part V pro-
poses a new rule of criminal procedure to assist lower courts in dealing with
equal protection challenges to peremptory strikes in the wake of J.E.B.?
I. The Supreme Court and Peremptory Challenges
The Court has described peremptory challenges, in general, as "a neces-
sary part of trial by jury"'24 and, in criminal cases, as "one of the most
important of the rights secured to the accused."' Nevertheless, the Court
explained m Swain v Alabama' that the Equal Protection Clause might
govern a state's exercise of these challenges in some circumstances.' Black
(arguing that extension of Batson to sex will result in serious erosion of peremptory chal-
lenge). Legal commentators have made similar predictions about the end of the peremptory
challenge in recent years. See Michael A. Cressler, Note, Powers v Oluo: The Death Knell
for the Peremptory Challenge?, 28 IDAHO L. REv 349, 353-54 (1991-1992) (criticizing
Powers v Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991), for diminishing importance of- if not abolishing -
peremptory challenges); Michael J. Desmond, Note, Limiting a Defendant's Peremptory
Challenges: Georgia v McCollum and the Problematic Extension of Equal Protection, 42
CATH. U. L. Rnv 389, 421-23 (1993) (explaining that Georgia v McCollum, 505 U.S. 42
(1992), may lead to elimination of peremptory challenges). Chief Justice Burger was one of
the first to pronounce the peremptory challenge dead. See Batson v Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,
112 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("Today the Court sets aside the peremptory challenge,
a procedure which has been part of the common law for many centuries and part of our jury
system for nearly 200 years.").
20. See infra notes 26-89 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court peremptory
challenge cases prior to J.E.B.).
21. See mfra notes 109-49 and accompanying text (discussing majority, concurrmng, and
dissenting opinions m J.E.B.).
22. See infra notes 150-230 and accompanying text (criticizing J.E.B.).
23. See infra notes 231-54 and accompanying text (proposing model rule of criminal
procedure to deal with peremptory challenges in wake of J.E.B.).
24. Swain v Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965), overruled in part, Batson v
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
25. Pointer v United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894); see mfra notes 191-94 and
accompanying text (discussing Court's emphasis on importance of peremptory challenges).
26. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
27 Swain v Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 223-24 (1965), overruled in part, Batson v
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). In Swain, the Court considered equal protection challenges
by Robert Swam, a black capital defendant, to the all-white grand jury that indicted him, the
1728
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criminal defendants had to show evidence of a pattern of strikes against
black venire members because the Court presumed that a prosecutor's
motive m using strikes in any given case was to secure a fair and impartial
jury I9 Swain also required black defendants to prove that a state consis-
all-white petit jury that convicted him, and the state's exercise of peremptory challenges
against black venire members. Id. at 203, 209, 222-23. The Court first held that because
Alabama did not, by statute, exclude blacks from'the jury lists from which the court chose
grand juries and veires, Swam failed to prove intentional discrimnation. Id. at 206-09.
Furthermore, the Court noted that statistical underrepresentation on grand juries or venires
was insufficient to support Swam's challenge. Id. The Court also rejected Swam's challenge
to Alabama's use of peremptory strikes m his particular case because, the Court explained,
evidence from a single case could not overcome the presumption that in any given case, a
state exercised its peremptory challenges to secure a fair and impartial jury. Id. at 221-22.
However, the Court hinted that proof of a pattern of race-based strikes in "case after case,
whatever the circumstances," id. at 223, might be sufficient to establish an Equal Protection
Clause violation. Id. at 223-24. Because Swam did not present evidence of such a pattern,
the Court rejected his claim. Id. at 225-28.
28. See Batson v Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 82 (1986) (explaining that defendant may
challenge state's exercise of race-based peremptory strikes). Prior to the Supreme Court's
decision m Batson, most of the defendants challenging jury selection practices were criminal
defendants. See, e.g., Hemandez v Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 476-77 (1954) (involving crimnal
defendant's challenge to selection of grand jury and petit jury panel); Akins v Texas, 325
U.S. 398, 399-400 (1945) (involving criminal defendant's challenge to selection of grand
jury); Norris v Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 588 (1935) (involving criminal defendant's chal-
lenge to selection of grand jury and petit jury venire); Rogers v Alabama, 192 U.S. 226, 229
(1904) (involving criminal defendant's challenge to selection of grand jury); In re Wood, 140
U.S. 278,279-80 (1891) (involving criminal defendant's challenge to selection of grand jury
and petit jury panel); Strauder v West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 304-05 (1879) (involving
criminal defendant's challenge to selection of grand jury and petit jury panel). The Court
subsequently extended the Batson doctrine and permitted states and civil litigants to raise
equal protection challenges to a criminal defendant's or an opposing litigant's exercise of per-
emptory strikes. See infra notes 63-77 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's
extension of Batson doctrine to civil litigants and criminal defendants).
29. See Swam, 380 U.S. at 221-24 (describing presumption insulating prosecutor's use
of peremptory challenges in individual case from equal protection scrutiny). In a dissent,
Justice Goldberg criticized the majority for overlooking what he perceived as overwhelming
evidence of abuse of the challenge. Id. at 233-38 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). However,
Justice Goldberg did agree with the Court's requirement that a defendant show a pattern of
abuse. Id. at 245-46 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). He explained:
Only where systematic exclusion has been shown, would the State be called upon
to justify its use of peremptones or to negative the State's involvement in discrim-
matory jury selection. Drawing the line in this fashion achieves a prac-
tical accommodation of the constitutional right and the operation of the peremptory
challenge system without doing violence to either.
Id. (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
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tently struck black venire members regardless of the defendant's race.'
Defendants had a difficult time overcoming this presumption, and some
Supreme Court members,31 lower courts,32 and legal scholars33 criticized
Swain. Many lower courts attempted to work around the decision by
crafting a remedy for abuse of the challenge. 4
30. Swain, 380 U.S. at 223-24; see Sheri L. Johnson, Black Innocence and the Wite
Jury, 83 Micn. L. REv 1611, 1658 & n.240 (1985) (explaining that Swain required criminal
defendants to prove systematic discrmination m several cases regardless of defendants' ;ace).
31. See Thompson v Illinois, 469 U.S. 1024, 1025-26 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (criticizing Swain's reasoning as misconceived); McCray v New
York, 461 U.S. 961, 964-65 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (criti-
cizmg Swain's evidentiary burden).
32. SeeMcCrayv. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1120-22 & n.2 (2d Cir. 1984) (criticizing
Swain's reasoning and documenting difficulty of overcoming Swain's evidentiary burden),
cert. granted and judgment vacated, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986); Commonwealth v Soares, 387
N.E.2d 499, 510 & n.11-12 (Mass.) (describing Swain's approach as simplistic and negligible
m its protection of criminal defendants' rights), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979).
33. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice and Juror, 20 GA. L. REv 257, 288 (1986)
(describing evidentiary burden faced by criminal defendants seeking to challenge race-based
peremptory strikes). Abramson writes that a defendant would need a "mammoth study of
numerous voir dires over a long period of time" to satisfy the Swain standard. Id., see also
Frederick L. Brown et al., The Peremptory Challenge as a Manipulative Device in Criminal
Trials: Traditional Use or Abuse, 14 NEw ENG. L. REv 192, 197-202 (1978) (describing
Swain evidentiary standard as difficult to meet); Johnson, supra note 30, at 1657-69 (criti-
cizing extreme difficulty of proving equal protection violation under Swain); Roger S. Kuhn,
Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. REv 235, 293-303 (1968) (criticizing
reasoning and result of Swain); George B. Smith, Swam v Alabama: The Use of Peremptory
Challenges to Strike Blacks from Juries, 27 How L.J. 1571, 1575-78 (1984) (arguing that
burden of proof in Swam is impossible to satisfy and that Court's reasoning is flawed); Roger
C. Harper, Note, Rethinking Limitations on the Peremptory Challenge, 85 COLUM. L. REV
1357, 1362 (1985) (describing Swain's burden of establishing equal protection violations as
insurmountable).
34. See Umted States v. Leslie, 759 F.2d 366, 373-75 (5th Cir. 1985) (invoking super-
visory authority of federal judges to control government abuse in exercise of peremptory
challenges), rev'd, 783 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc), cert. granted and judgment
vacated, 479 U.S. 1074 (1987); United States v McDaniels, 379 F Supp. 1243, 1249-50
(E.D. La. 1974) (ordering new trial under Rule 33 of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
because Government struck six of seven black venire members); People v Wheeler, 583 P.2d
748, 761-62 (Cal. 1978) (determining that state's challenge of every black venire member
violated defendant's state constitutional right to jury drawn from representative cross-section
of community); Soares, 387 N.E.2d at 515-16 (concluding that peremptory challenges based
solely on group membership violated fair trial by impartial jury provisions of 'tate consti-
tution); see also Johnson, supra note 30, at 1659-63 (noting that lower courts have crafted
solutions to avoid Swain's standard); Toni M. Massaro, Peremptores or Peers? - Rethinking




In Batson v Kentucky,35 the Supreme Court partially overruled Swain
by holding that a enminal defendant could state an equal protection clann
based on the state's use of peremptory challenges m an individual case.36
The Batson Court explained that the evidentiary burden m Swain was "t crp-
Many criminal defendants raised Sixth Amendment challenges to the state's use of per-
emptory strikes. See Booker v Jabe, 775 F.2d 762, 770-72 (6th Cir. 1985) (concluding that
Sixth Amendment prohibits state from exercising peremptory challenges to exclude members
of cognzable groups), cert. granted and judgment vacated sub nom. Michigan v Booker, 478
U.S. 1001, reinstated on remand Booker v Jabe, 801 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1046 (1987); McCray, 750 F.2d at 1131 (concluding that Sixth Amendment pro-
hibits race-based peremptory challenges); see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 112-15 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (observing that Batson challenged state's use of race-based peremptory strikes
under Sixth Amendment). Holland v Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990), foreclosed any possi-
bility of a Sixth Amendment attack on a state's exercise of peremptory challenges. See mfra
notes 42-48 and accompanying text (explaining that Holland held peremptory challenges
immune from Sixth Amendment scrutiny).
For a full discussion of lower courts' approaches to Swain, see generally Phyllis N.
Silverman, Comment, Survey of the Law of Peremptory Challenges: Uncertainty in the
Cnmimal Law, 44 U. PITT. L. REv 673 (1983) (reviewing lower courts' handling of Swain
claims and discussing legislative alternatives to Swain).
35. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
36. Batson v Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 (1986). In Batson, the Court considered
an equal protection challenge by a black criminal defendant to the state's use of peremptory
challenges to strike all blacks from the veire. Id. at 82-84. The Court rejected Swain's
pattern of abuse requirement as too burdensome and held that a defendant could challenge the
state's use of peremptory strikes in a particular case. Id. at 92-95. The Court outlined a
three-step process for evaluating those strikes. Id. at 96-98. First, the defendant must
establish a prima facie case by showing: 1) that he is a member of a cogmzable racial group,
2) that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges against members of the venire belonging
to the defendant's racial group, and 3) that all relevant facts and circumstances of the
particular case to raise the inference that the state had intentionally discriminated on the basis
of race. Id. at 96-98. Second, when the defendant establishes the prima facie case, the
burden shifts to the state to rebut the inference by justifying the strike with a race-neutral
reason - one that cannot be a pretext but one that need not "rise to the level justifying
exercise of a challenge for cause." Id. at 97-98. The third step is the trial court's
determination of whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant has proven
purposeful discrimination. Id. at 98. Because Batson preserved his objections to the state's
peremptory challenges, the Court remanded the case to give the state the opportunity to
present race-neutral reasons for the peremptory strikes. Id. at 100.
For a full discussion of Batson, see Catherine Beckley, Note, Batson v Kentucky:
Challenging the Use of the Peremptory Challenge, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 263, 290-302 (1988)
(discussing Batson's reasoning and implications). The Court's decision in Batson, however,
left many issues surrounding peremptory challenges unresolved. See Albert W Alschuler,
The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury
Verdicts, 56 U. CHi. L. REV 153, 169-99 (1989) (discussing seven areas of litigation that
Batson created that lower courts had to resolve).
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pling" to defendants and that Swain effectively prevented any equal protec-
tion claims from succeeding.' In addition, race-based challenges harmed the
crminal defendant, the excluded juror, and the whole commumty by under-
mining public confidence in the fairness of the judicial system.38 Relying on
vemre selection cases decided after Swam, the Batson Court concluded that
a defendant could show purposeful racial discrimination in petit jury selec-
tion using evidence from a single case and required the state to provide race-
neutral reasons for challenges after a defendant established a prima facie case
of racial discrumnation. 9 Justice Marshall concurred, but advocated abol-
ishing the peremptory strike for both prosecutors and defense attorneys
because the challenge had the inherent potential for abuse.' Justice Marshall
37 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 92-93 (explaining constitutional scrutiny given to state's
use of peremptory challenges). The Court described the prosecutor's use of peremptory
strikes as "largely immune from constitutional scrutiny." Id., see also supra notes 31-33 (dis-
cussing criticism of Swain's evidentiary burden).
38. Batson, 476 U.S. at 86-87; see David E. Marko, The Case Against Gender-Based
Peremptory Challenges, 4 HAsMrlS WOMEN'S L.J. 109, 121 (1993) (arguing that discrimuna-
tory exercise of peremptory challenges potentially results in jury that community perceives
as biased). For a detailed criticism of the Court's reasoning in Batson, see Cressler, supra
note 19, at 368-94 (criticizing Court's equal protection reasoning and public policy arguments
in Batson).
39. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98. As commentators have noted, lower court decisions
have fleshed out the contours of the questions that Batson left unanswered, such as what a
defendant must do to establish a prima facie case and which reasons used to justify a
peremptory challenge are sufficiently race-neutral. See Alan Raphael, Discnminatory Jury
Selection: Lower Court Implementation of Batson v Kentucky, 25 WiLLAMVETE L. REV 293,
309-38 (1989) (discussing application of Batson by lower courts); David D. Hopper, Note,
Batson v Kentucky and the Prosecutonal Peremptory Challenge: Arbitrary and Capncious
Equal Protection?, 74 VA. L. REV 811, 817-36 (1988) (same). For an argument that Batson
imposes lower burdens on the defendant and higher burdens on the state than in other equal
protection contexts, see Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN.
L. REv. 1105, 1121-23 (1989) (arguing that test in Batson is stricter than test that Court uses
in employment and housing discrimination cases). Also, Batson did not specify the pro-
cedures that lower courts should follow in resolving these issues. Batson, 476 U.S. at 99-100
& n.24; see also id. at 130-31 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for failing to
establish procedures for lower courts to follow). For a full discussion of this issue, see Brett
M. Kavanaugh, Defense Presence and Participation: A Procedural Minimum for Batson v
Kentucky Hearngs, 99 YALE L.J. 187, 193-206 (1989) (arguing that lower courts should
permit defendant to attend Batson hearings and permit defendant to rebut state's reasons for
exercising challenges); L. Ashley Lyu, Note, Getting at the Truth: Adversanal Hearngs in
Batson Inquines, 57 FoRDHAM L. REV 725, 732-43 (1989) (arguing that lower courts should
hold adversarial hearings rather than in camera or exparte proceedings).
40. Batson, 476 U.S. at 107 (Marshall, J., concurring); see infra note 237 (citing legal
commentators who advocate abolishing peremptory challenges).
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believed that the Court's test for assessing the constitutionality of the state's
challenges was insufficient because the test still required "flagrant" discrum-
nation and an assessment of the prosecutor's motive - something a review-
mg court would only reluctantly second-guess. 4'
In Holland v lllinois,4 the Court concluded that the Sixth Amendmen 3
did not prohibit a state's use of race-based peremptory challenges and
declined to extend Batson beyond the Fourteenth Amendment context. 
4
Prior decisions of the Court had held that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee
of trial by an inpartial jury required that states draw petit juries from a
representative venire, one that reflected a "fair cross-section" of the com-
munity 5 However, the Holland Court noted that, in these prior cases, the
Court had explicitly refused to interpret the Sixth Amendment to require
individual petit juries to reflect the community in composition and had
refused to limit or prohibit peremptory challenges under the fair-cross-sec-
41. Batson, 476 U.S. at 104-08 (Marshall, J., concurring).
42. 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
43. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides, m part: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed " Id.
44. See Holland v Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 478, 486-87 (1990) (concluding that Sixth
Amendment does not prohibit state from using peremptory challenges to eliminate distinctive
groups from vemre). In Holland, the Court considered a white criminal defendant's Sixth
Amendment challenge to Illinois's use of peremptory challenges to eliminate the only two
black venre members. Id. at 475-76. The Court first decided that the defendant had standing
to challenge the state's exercise of peremptory strikes because the Sixth Amendment does not
require a racial correlation between the defendant and the excluded venire member. Id. at
476-77 Next, the Court explained that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial
jury only required the state to ensure that a venire represented a fair cross-section of the
community Id. at 480. Including "all cognizable groups m the venire" satisfies this fair-
cross-section requirement. Id. at 478-80. Because the Sixth Amendment requires an unpar-
tial jury and not a representative one - and ensuring a fair cross-section fulfills that require-
ment - the Court declined to allow defendants to challenge the selection of an individual
juror under the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 480-83. Concluding that the peremptory challenge
furthered the goal of an impartial jury by allowing both sides to eliminate extremes of
partiality and bias, id. at 483-84, the Court refused to "obstruct[ ]" and "cripple" the chal-
lenge by adopting a Batson-type test for the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 484-87 For a full
discussion of Holland, see generally Carolyn R. Alessi, Comment, Holland v Illinois: Are
Discnmnatory Peremptory Challenges Constitutional?, 26 NEW ENG. L. REv 173 (1991)
(discussing and analyzing Holland within context of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence); Alice
Biedenbender, Note, Holland v. Illinois: A Sixth Amendment Attack on the Use of Discnmna-
tory Peremptory Challenges, 40 CATH. U. L. Rnv 651 (1991) (same).
45. Holland, 493 U.S. at 480 (citing and quoting Taylor v Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,
527 (1975)).
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tion requirement. 46 Reaffirming these holdings and re-emphasizing the role
that the peremptory challenge plays in securing an impartial jury, the Hol-
land Court concluded that the exercise of challenges against particular
groups did not violate the Sixth Amendment.47 Some commentators criti-
cized Holland as a step backward from Batson.'
The Supreme Court, in Powers v Ohio,49 dispelled any doubts that
Holland had rendered Batson a dead letter by squarely addressing a question
that the Court explicitly left open in Holland.') The Court permitted a crm-
mal defendant of a different race than an excluded juror to raise an equal
46. Id. at 482 (citing and quoting Lockhart v McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173 (1986), and
Taylor v Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975)).
47 Id. at 480-84.
48. See Alessi, supra note 44, at 189-97 (criticizing Holland for misreading prior Sixth
Amendment opinions); Jefferson E. Howeth, Note, Holland v Illinois: The Supreme Court
Narrows the Scope of Protection Against Discriminatory Jury Selection Procedures, 48
WASH. & LEE L. REv 579, 586-615 (1991) (criticizing Holland for misreading prior Sixth
Amendment cases and limiting defendants' constitutional protection from discriminatory jury
selection procedures). Howeth argues that Batson created a relatively limited Fourteenth
Amendment cause of action against a state's use of peremptory challenges. Id. at 602-15.
The Sixth Amendment, Howeth explains, niposes more lenient standing requirements, pro-
tects more cognizable groups, and involves no state action component. Id. Thus, by elim-
inating the Sixth Amendment avenue for attacking peremptory challenges, Holland limted
the constitutional protection from discriminatory jury selection procedures. Id. at 602-03;
see also Shola R. Ayem, Comment, Trial by an Impartial Jury Drawn from a Fair Cross-
Section of the Community: A Fundamental Right Deeply Rooted in Our Natural Rights and
Liberty, 16 T. MARSHALL L. REv 93, 102-07 (1990) (criticizing Court's approach to Sixth
Amendment in Holland); Debra L. Dippel, Note, Holland v Illinois: Sixth Amendment Fair
Cross-Section Requirement Does Not Preclude Racially-Based Peremptory Challenges, 24
AKRON L. REv 177, 188-96 (1990) (arguing that Holland incorrectly subordinates consti-
tutional command of nondiscriminatory jury selection procedures to state interest in pre-
serving peremptory challenges). For positive commentary on Holland, see Biedenbender,
supra note 44, at 674-78 (arguing that Court decided Holland correctly).
49 499 U.S. 40.0 (1991).
50. See supra note 44 (explaining that white defendant had standing to raise Sixth
Amendment challenge to state's use of race-based peremptory challenges against black jury
panelists). In Holland, Justice Scalia's majority opinion implied that Batson required a
correlation between the race of the defendant and the excluded juror. Holland, 493 U.S. at
476-77 A concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy and the dissenting opinions by Justices
Marshall and Stevens noted that the Court had not addressed the question of whether Batson
required that correlation. Id. at 488 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 490-91 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); id. at 505 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Foreshadowing the Court's conclusion in
Powers, all three Justices concluded that a white defendant would have standing under the
Equal Protection Clause to challenge the exclusion of a black venire member. Id. at 488-90




protection claim on behalf of that jtror.5 ' The Powers Court reaffirmed
Batson's holding that a race-based peremptory strike constituted a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause.' A race-based strike, the Powers Court
explained, harmed the excluded juror and the community at large because
the strike foreclosed the opportunity to participate in civic life by serving on
a jury ' Such discriminatory challenges also caused a distinct injury to the
defendant by calling into question the fairness and integrity of the entire
proceeding.' In addition, because both the defendant and the excluded jury
panelist share a common interest in removing racial discrimination from the
jury selection process - and because the obstacles to an excluded jury
panelist bringing an equal protection claim are so great - the Powers Court
concluded that the defendant had standing to raise the equal protection claim
of vemre members of a different race. 5 The Powers Court therefore ex-
tended Batson's protection to white criminal defendants.5 6
51. Powers v Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991). In Powers, the Court considered an
equal protection challenge brought by a white criminal defendant to the state's use of peremp-
tory strikes against black jury panelists. Id. at 402-03. The Court explained that the harm
to an excluded venre member was as nportant as the harm to the individual defendant. Id.
at 406. These harms prevented qualified citizens from serving on a jury and reinforced the
Court's conclusion that race-based peremptory challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. at 406-09. Next, the Court considered whether this criminal defendant had standing to
raise an excluded venire member's equal protection clain. Id. at 410. First, the Court
determined that the defendant suffered a concrete injury because the state's use of race-based
strikes raised doubts about the fairness and integrity of the proceedings. Id. at 411-13. Next,
the Court concluded that the defendant and an excluded jury panelist had a close relationship
because both had an interest m "eliminating racial discrimination from the courtroom." Id.
at 413-14. Finally, the Court noted that a struck jury panelist would have great difficulty
bringing an equal protection claim on his own because of the small amount of money involved
and the difficulty of obtaining injunctive relief. Id. at 414-15. Because the defendant had
standing, the Court held that he could challenge the state's peremptory strikes under the Equal
Protection Clause on behalf of excluded venire members. Id. at 415.
52. Id. at 409-10.
53. Id. at 406.
54. Id. at 411. This harm satisfied the injury-m-fact requirement of the Court's
standing test. Id.
55. Id. at 413-15. For a discussion of the Powers Court's third-party standing analysis,
see Bradley R. Kirk, Note, MilUng the New Sacred Cow: The Supreme Court Limits the
Peremptory Challenge on Racial Grounds in Powers v Ohio and Edmonson v Leesville
Concrete Co., 19 PEPP L. REV 691, 704-11 (1992) (questioning Powers Court's standing
analysis).
56. Powers, 499 U.S. at 415. Batson involved an equal protection claim brought by
a black criminal defendant against the state's exclusion of black venire members. Batson v
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 82-84 (1986); see supra note 36 (discussing Batson). Powers evoked
an interesting response in legal commentary. Compare Cressler, supra note 19, at 368-94
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In Hernandez v New York,' the Court rejected a defendant's objection
to New York's use of peremptory challenges against Spamsh-speaking jury
panelists and implied that the Batson principle had limits. 58 The defendant
had argued that language ability bore a close enough relation to ethmcity to
make the language-based strike an unconstitutional race-based strike against
Latinos." The Court partially based its conclusion that the challenges did
(criticizing Powers Court for not overruling Batson) with Carolyn Holtschlag, Recent
Decisions, 30 DUQ. L. REv 1025, 1048-51 (1992) (criticizng Powers Court for fWiling to
completely abolish peremptory challenges). See also Kirk, supra note 55, at 728-29
(explaining that legislative change is preferable to judicial activism in solving problems of
race-based peremptory challenges).
57 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
58. Hemandez v New York, 500 U.S. 352, 369-70 (1991). In Hernandez, the Court
considered a criminal defendant's Batson challenge to New York's alleged use of peremptory
challenges against Latmo venire members. 1d. at 355-56. During Hernandez's trial for
attempted murder and weapons possession, the state peremptorily struck four Spanish-
speaking jury panelists. Id. at 355-56. The state explained that it struck the venire members
in question because they spoke Spanish and, based on their responses to questions and
behavior during voir dire, the state doubted whether these jury panelists would rely solely on
the court interpreter rather than their own linguistic ability to translate the testimony in the
case. Id. at 356. The Court reviewed the lower court's rejection of the defendant's Batson
claim under the deferential clearly erroneous standard because lower courts were better-
situated to evaluate the credibility of the state's justification for its peremptory strikes. 1d.
at 364-69. Following the three-part Batson test, the Court concluded that the issue of whether
the defendant proved his prima facie case was moot because the state had voluntarily provided
a race-neutral reason for its use of challenges. Id. at 358-59. Next, the Court let stand as
not clearly erroneous the lower court's finding that the state's explanation for its strikes was
sufficiently race-neutral. Id. at 361-63. Although striking vernre members based on their
ability to follow court interpreters might have a disproportionate impact on Latinos, that
impact, the Court explained, was insufficient to establish discriminatory intent. Id. Under
the totality of the circumstances, the Court ultimately determined that the lower court did not
commit clear error in choosing to reject Hernandez's Batson claim. Id. at 369-70. The lower
court properly considered all the relevant factors, including, among others, the state's
voluntary justification for its strikes, the fact that the court could determine only that three
of the four jury panelists were Latmo, and the lower court's assessment of the state
prosecutor's demeanor and credibility, among others, in reaching its conclusion. Id. For a
discussion of how lower courts have implemented Hernandez, see Cheryl A. O'Brien, Note,
Constitutional Law - Hernandez v New York: Did the Supreme Court Intend to Overrule
Batson's Standard of "Racially Neutral"?, 15 W NEW ENG. L. REv 315, 334-38 (1993)
(analyzing lower courts' treatment of Hernandez).
59. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360. The Court did not address this argument, but Justice
Kennedy's plurality opinion hinted that a pure language-based strike might violate the Equal
Protection Clause:
[W]e do not resolve the more difficult question of the breadth with which the concept
of race should be defined for equal protection purposes. We would face a quite differ-
ent case if the prosecutor had justified his peremptory challenges with the explanation
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not violate Batson on facts unrelated to language ability, such as the fact that
many prosecution witnesses were Latinos, which diminished the likelihood
that the state would deliberately exclude Latinos from the jury 60 In a
dissent, Justice Stevens criticized the majority for permitting the state's
justification for its challenges to rebut the defendant's prima facie case when
that justification had an admittedly disproportionate impact against Latinos. 61
Because the Court seemed to require that the state's justification itself
provide evidence of discriminatory intent, Justice Stevens expressed concern
that the Court had raised the level of proof that Batson required.62
that he did not want Spanish-speaking jurors. It may well be, for certain ethnic groups
and in some communities, that proficiency in a particular language, like skin color,
should be treated as a surrogate for race under an equal protection analysis.
Id. at 371 (plurality opinion). This language probably explains the separate concurrence of
Justices O'Connor and Scalia, who agreed that the lower court's findings as to discriminatory
intent were not clearly erroneous but thought that the plurality opinion went further than nec-
essary to amve at this conclusion. Id. at 372-75 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
Some commentators read Hernandez as a clear statement that Batson prohibits peremp-
tory challenges based on ethnicity and ancestry See Elaine A. Carlson, Batson, J.E.B., and
Beyond: The Paradoxical Quest for Reasoned Peremptory Strikes in the Jury Selection
Process, 46 BAYLOR L. Ray 947, 967 n.125 (1994) (arguing that Hernandez prohibits
peremptory challenges against Latino or Hispanic vemre members); Steven M. Puiszis,
Edmonson v Leesville Concrete Co.. Will the Peremptory Challenge Survive Its Battle with
the Equal Protection Clause?, 25 J. MARsHALLL. REV 37, 43-44 n.32 (1991) (arguing that
Court intended Hernandez to apply Batson to ancestry and ethnic heritage, wich explains
separate concurrence of Justices O'Connor and Scalia). But see Juan F Perea, Hernandez
v. New York: Courts, Prosecutors, and the Fear of Spanish, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV 1, 20-21
(1992) (arguing that Hernandez permits discrimination based on national origin and ethnicity
in state's exercise of peremptory challenges).
60. Hemandez, 500 U.S. at 369-70. But see Andrew McGuire, Comment, Peremptory
Exclusion of Spanish-Speaking Jurors: Could Hernandez v New York Happen Here?, 23
N.M. L. RE. 467, 471-72 (1993) (arguing that Hernandez legitimizes peremptory challenges
based solely on language ability). McGuire argues that bilingual jurors have difficulty
ignoring what a witness says in Spanish; therefore, the Hernandez Court's reliance on the
venire members' behavior m concluding that the state's reason for striking the jurors was
sufficiently race-neutral is likely to become the rule rather than the exception. Id. at 472 &
n.46; see also Perea, supra note 59, at 15-21 (1992) (arguing that language-ability and
demeanor during voir dire are pretextual reasons that permit prosecutors to discriminate on
basis of ethimcity in exercising peremptory challenges).
61. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 376-77 (Stevens, J., dissenting). As Justice Stevens
explained, disproportionate impact is itself evidence of discriminatory intent. Id. at 376-78
& n.1. Thus, the Court permitted a justification that could provide evidence of discrimna-
tory intent to rebut an inference of discriminatory intent that the defendant established in his
prima facie case. Id.
62. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 377-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see James S. Wrona,
Casenote, Hernandez v New York: Allowing Bias to Continue in the Jury Selection Process,
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In the same year, though, the Supreme Court expanded Batson m
Edmonson v Leesville Concrete Co. 63 by holding that civil litigants may not
exercise their peremptory challenges m a racially discriminatory manner. 64
Acknowledging that the Court decided Batson and Powers m the criminal
context, the Edmonson Court explained that neither of those two cases sug-
gested that litigants could use race-based peremptory strikes in civil cases.'
A race-based peremptory challenge, the Court explained, harmed an ex-
cluded jury panelist in a civil trial as much as a similarly situated panelist in
a criminal trial.' However, the Edmonson Court had to find state action
19 OFHoN.U. L. REV. 151, 157-61 (1992) (criticizing Hernandez for relying on prosecutor's
explanation in determining race-neutrality of peremptory challenges and for employing clear
error standard of review). For a related argument expressing concerns that lower courts
would read Hernandez as partially overruling Batson, see O'Brien, supra note 58, at 332-45
(arguing that Hernandez did not overrule Batson's requirement of nexus between state's
justification for peremptory challenges and case at hand).
63. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
64. Edmonson v Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991). In Edmonson,
the Court considered an equal protection challenge by a black plaintiff against a defendant's
use of peremptory strikes against black venire members. Id. at 616-17 Because the Equal
Protection Clause applies only to state action, the Court had to determine whether Leesville
Concrete Co. was a state actor under the two-part test developed in Lugar v Edmondson Oil
Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939-42 (1982). Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 620. First, a federal statute
provided authority for the defendant's peremptory challenges, satisfying the first prong of the
Lugar test. Id. at 620-21, Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939. Next, the Court explained that "fairness"
under the second prong of the Lugar test involved a factual inquiry into (1) the reliance of the
defendant on state government assistance m striking jurors, (2) the function of the peremptory
challenge in government, and (3) the potential aggravating effect of a strike authorized by the
government. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 621-22; Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939. To begin, the Court
found that all private parties rely on a court's "overt [and] significant assistance," Edmonson,
500 U.S. at 624, to use a peremptory challenge: establishing juror qualifications, calling and
excusing jurors, and controlling voir dire questions that may determine which jurors litigants
will strike. Id. at 622-24. Next, private litigants used the peremptory strike as a tool m the
process of selecting the jury, a "quintessential governmental body"; therefore, the jury selec-
tion process was a "traditional function of the government." Id. at 624-28. Finally, the
Court found that race-based peremptory challenges caused greater harm because parties exer-
cised such strikes within a courtroom. Id. at 628. Having found state action, the Court
determined that the Equal Protection Clause therefore governed the defendant's use of per-
emptory strikes. Id. The Court concluded the analysis by determining, under Powers v
Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410-15 (1991), that a civil litigant had third-party standing to raise the
equal protection claims of excluded jurors. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 628-30; see supra note
51 (discussing Court's third-party standing analysis in Powers). The Court remanded the case
so the trial court could determine whether the plaintiff could make out a prima facie case of
discrimination. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 631.
65. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 618.
66. Id. at 618-19.
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before addressing the constitutionality of race-based peremptory challenges. 67
Applying the state action test,6 the Edmonson Court determined that the
parties had federal statutory authorization for their peremptory challenges. 69
The Edmonson Court determined that because selecting a jury was a "tradi-
tional government function," a civil litigant's exercise of those strikes
carried the imprimatur of the judicial system.7' The Edmonson Court com-
pleted its analysis by concluding, under Powers, that civil litigants, like
criminal defendants, have standing to raise the equal protection claims of
excluded jurors.7'
The Supreme Court's final extension of Batson prior to J.E.B. came m
Georgia v McCollum,' in which the Court held that a criminal defendant
may not exercise peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner.73
67 Id. at 619-20; see also supra note 2 (quoting Fourteenth Amendment's state action
component).
68. See Lugar v Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939-42 (1982) (outlining and
applying two-part test for determining presence of state action); see also supra note 64
(discussing application of Lugar m Edmonson).
69. Edmonson v Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620-21 (1991). The Court
explained that at the state level, state statutes or rules of criminal procedure typically provide
authorization for peremptory challenges. Id.
70. Id. at 621-28. Many comrentators criticized the Edmonson Court's state action
analysis. See Bill K. Felty, Note, Resting in Mid-Air, the Supreme Court Strikes the
Traditional Peremptory Challenge and Creates a New Creature, the Challenge for Semi-
Cause: Edrnonson v Leesville Concrete Company, 27 TULSA L.J. 203, 216-20 (1991)
(criticizing state action analysis m Edmonson as flawed); J. Patrick McCabe, Casenote, The
Use of Race-Based Peremptory Challenges in a Civil Trial to Exclude Potential Jurors During
Votr Dire Violates the Equal Protection Rights of the Challenged Jurors, 2 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 861, 892-95 (1992) (arguing that Edmonson Court blurred distinction between
state and private action to advance social policy goals). But see Mark L. Josephs, Comment,
Fourteenth Amendment - Peremptory Challenges and the Equal Protection Clause, 82 J.
CRim. L. & CRmuloLoGy 1000, 1018-23 (1992) (arguing that Edmonson Court applied state
action test correctly).
71. Edmnonson, 500 U.S. at 628-31. For a full discussion of Edmonson and its implica-
tions for the peremptory challenge, see Frederick V Olson, Casenote, Edmonson v Leesville
Concrete Co.. Reasoned orResult-Onented Jurisprudence?, 12 N. ILL. U. L. REV 497, 507-
25 (1992) (concluding that Edmonson seriously weakens peremptory challenges).
72. 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
73. Georgia v McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 49-55 (1992). In McCollum, the Court
considered whether the Equal Protection Clause governed a criminal defendant's use of race-
based peremptory challenges. Id. at 44-45. A lower court had denied Georgia's pretrial
motion seeking to prevent several white defendants from using their peremptory challenges
to strike all of the black members of the venire. Id. at 45. The Court first determined that
a defendant's exercise of a race-based peremptory strike implicated the Batson concerns
because such a strike harmed both the excluded jurors and the community at large. Id. at 48-
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In McCollum, Georgia sought a declaration prior to jury selection in a
criminal case that would have prohibited the. defendant from exercising Ins
peremptory strikes to remove all blacks from the jury panel.74 The Mc-
Collum Court's analysis paralleled the Edmonson Court's analysis - first
determining that a criminal defendant's exercise of a race-based peremptory
challenge harms an excluded jury panelist, then finding that a defendant is
a state actor when using his peremptory strikes.75 In addition, the McCollum
Court concluded that under Powers, the state had standing to raise the equal
protection claim of an excluded venire member.76 Many commentators criti-
cized the decision for eroding the rights of criminal defendants.'
Although McCollum seems facially anomalous,7' some Court members
predicted McCollum's result in prior opinions. 79 The decision was essen-
50; Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-88 (1986). Next, the Court applied the state action
test of Lugar, determining that a criminal defendant was a state actor when exercising per-
emptory strikes. McCollum, 505 U.S. at 50-55; see supra note 64 (discussing application of
Lugar to civil litigants' use of peremptory challenges). The Court then determined that a state
had standing to challenge the defendant's discriminatory use of peremptory strikes. Mc-
Co/!um, 505 U.S. at 55-56; see supra text accompanying note 55 (discussing Powers Court's
application of third-party standing doctrine). Finally, the Court addressed concerns that the
application of Batson to this context would interfere with a criminal defendant's constitutional
rights. McCollum, 505 U.S. at 57-58. The Court rejected these concerns because barring
a defendant's use of race-based challenges does not violate either the attorney-client privilege
or the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights - trial by an impartial jury and effective assist-
ance of counsel. Id. at 58. Consequently, the Court held that a criminal defendant's use of
race-based peremptory challenges violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 59.
74. McCollum, 505 U.S. at 44-45.
75. Id. at 48-55; see supra note 64 (discussing Edmonson).
76. McCollum, 505 U.S. at 55-56.
77 See Fred Glassman, Casenote, The Supreme Court Strikes a Blow Against Minority
Criminal Defendants, 18 S. ILL. U. L. REv 255, 264-67 (1993) (arguing that McCollum
harms ability of minority defendants to receive fair trial); Jennifer L. Urbanski, Casenote,
Georgia v McCollum:. Protecting Jurors from Race-Based Peremptory Challenges but
Forcing Criminal Defendants to Risk Biased Juries, 24 PAC. L.J. 1887, 1933-44 (1993)
(arguing that McCollum denies criminal defendant important method of securing fair trial and
impartial jury).
78. Cf. Georgia v McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 62 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(describing Court's holding in McCollum as "remarkable").
79. See Edmonson v Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 644 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that Edmonson's analysis logically applies to criminal defendants' use of
peremptory strikes); Batson v Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 125-26 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dis-
senting) (arguing that "clear and inescapable import" of Batson is to limit use of peremptory
challenges by defendants as well as prosecutors). In Batson, Justice Marshall advocated the
abolition of peremptory challenges for both the state and the criminal defendant, explaining:
"Our criminal justice system 'requires not only freedom from any bias against the accused,
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tially an amalgam of the Court's novel approaches to third-party standing m
Powers and to state action m Edmonson."° In addition, commentators had
noted the incongruity of prohibiting prosecutors from exercising peremptory
challenges on the basis of race but permitting criminal defendants to do so.8'
Therefore, the result in McCollum was not entirely surprising.'
In summary, prior to J.E.B., peremptory challenge jurisprudence had
evolved to the point at which state (and federal) prosecutors,' civil liti-
gants,'" and criminal defendants' could not exercise peremptory challenges
on the basis of race. In addition, a party challenging such race-based strikes
could rely on the facts of an individual case and did not need to be a mem-
ber of the same racial group as the excluded juror.' Moreover, the Court
had suggested that although peremptory challenges associated wit linguistic
ability might survive equal protection scrutiny, pure language-based strikes
might not survive.' Finally, the Court had refused to apply the Sixth
Amendment to the exercise of peremptory strikes,89 making the Equal Pro-
tection Clause the only avenue by which a party could raise a constitutional
challenge to an opposing party's exercise of peremptory strikes.
but also from any prejudice against his prosecution. Between hin and the state the scales are
to be evenly held.'" Batson, 476 U.S. at 107 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting Hayes v
Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887)).
80. See McCollum, 505 U.S. at 50-56 (applying Edmonson's state action analysis and
Powers' third-party standing analysis).
81. See E. Vaughn Dunnigan, Note, Discrinmnation by the Defense: Peremptory Chal-
lengesAfterBatson v. Kentucky, 88 COLUM. L. REV 355, 358-68 (1988) (arguing that Court
should extend Batson to limit criminal defendants' exercise of race-based peremptory chal-
lenges); John J. Hoeffner, Note, Defendant's Discnrunatory Use of the Peremptory Chal-
lengeAfter Batson v. Kentucky, 62 ST. JOHN'S L. REV 46, 52-65 (1987) (arguing that courts
or legislatures should limit criminal defendants' use of race-based peremptory strikes). But
see Katherine Goldwasser, Limiting a Crnmnal Defendant's Use of Peremptory Challenges:
On Symmetry and the Jury m a Cruminal Tral, 102 HARv L. REv 808, 811-38 (1989) (argu-
ing that Court should not impose Batson rule on criminal defendants' use of race-based per-
emptory challenges).
82. See McCollum, 505 U.S. at 69 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that McCollum
follows logically from Edmonson).
83. Batson v Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 (1986).
84. Edmonson v Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991).
85. Georgia v McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992).
86. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
87 Powers v Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402-03 (1991).
88. Hernandez v New York, 500 U.S. 352, 369-71 (1991).
89. Holland v Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 478 (1990).
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Prior to J.E.B., the Court declined to hear several cases that involved
challenges to a party's use of peremptory strikes based on sex' or other
factors unrelated to race. 91 Of course, some commentators had argued that
Batson's rationale applied with equal force to sex-based challenges,' and
many courts had extended Batson in this fashion.93 However, many federal' 4
90. See United States v Nichols, 937 F.2d 1257, 1262 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting that
Batson only applies to race-based peremptory challenges), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1080
(1992); United States v Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038, 1042-43 (4th Cir. 1988) (same), cert.
dismissed sub nom. Washington v United States, 489 U.S. 1094 (1989), and cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1069 (1990); Murphy v State, 596 So. 2d 42, 43 (Ala. Crim. App.) (same), writ
denied, 596 So. 2d 45 (Ala. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 86 (1992); Fisher v State, 587
So. 2d 1027, 1030 (Ala. Crim. App.) (same), cert. denied, 587 So. 2d 1039 (Ala. 1991),
cert. denied, 503 U.S. 941 (1992); Daniels v State, 581 So. 2d 536, 538-39 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1990) (same), writ denied, 581 So. 2d 541 (Ala.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 914 (1991).
91. See Murchu v United States, 926 F.2d 50, 54-55 (1st Cir.) (concluding that Irish
are not cognizable group under Batson), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 828 (1991); State v Davis,
504 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Minn. 1993) (declining to extend Batson to exercise of peremptory
challenges based on religious affiliation), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994).
92. See Marko, supra note 38, at 121-27 (arguing that Batson's rationale logically
prohibits sex-based challenges); Jere W Morehead, Exploring the Frontiers of Batson v
Kentucky: Should the Safeguards of Equal Protection Extend to GenderP, 14 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 289, 299-304 (1990) (arguing that spirit of Batson requires extension of Batson's
protections to any cognizable group); Eric K. Ferraro, Note, United States v De Gross: The
Ninth Circuit Expands Restrictions on a Criminal Defendant's Right to Exercise Peremptory
Challenges, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 109, 132-33 (1993) (concluding that similar history
of discrimination in jury service against blacks and women justifies sunilar treatment of those
groups under Equal Protection Clause in peremptory challenge context); S. Alexandria Jo,
Comment, Reconstruction of the Peremptory Challenge System: A Look at Gender-Based
Peremptory Challenges, 22 PAc. L.J. 1305, 1327-31 (1991) (explaining that prohibition of
sex-based challenges is logical extension of Batson's rationale).
93. See United States v De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433, 1437-39 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc)
(expanding Batson to prohibit sex-based challenges in civil and criminal trials). For state
court extensions of Batson, see Di Donato v Santini, 232 Cal. App. 3d 721, 731 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991) (concluding that sex-based challenges m civil trials violate state and federal con-
stitutions); Laidler v State, 627 So. 2d 1263, 1263-64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (holding
that sex-based challenges violate state and federal constitutions); State v Levinson, 795 P.2d
845, 849-50 (Haw. 1990) (concluding that sex-based peremptory challenges violate state
constitution); People v Mitchell, 593 N.E.2d 882, 888-89 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that
sex-based challenges are unconstitutional under principles of both state and federal constitu-
tions and state and federal case law), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 614 N.E.2d 1213 (11.
1993); Commonwealth v Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499, 516 (Mass.) (concluding that sex-based
challenges violate state constitution), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); State v Gonzales,
808 P.2d 40, 48 (N.M. Ct. App.) (concluding that state constitution prohibits sex-based
peremptory challenges), cert. denied, 806 P.2d 65 (N.M. 1991); People v Blunt, 561
N.Y.S.2d 90, 92 (N.Y App. Div 1990) (concluding that sex-based peremptory challenges
violate state constitution and state statutory law); People v Irizarry, 560 N.Y.S.2d 279, 280
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and state courts95 that considered the issue declined to extend Batson. In
addition, all of the Court's extensions of the Batson principle - Powers,
Edmonson, and McCollum - appeared in the context of race-based
peremptory challenges exercised against black venire members.'s None
of these cases ever hinted that Batson's principles applied to sex-based
peremptory challenges. 7 Indeed, Justice O'Connor had described Batson
as a special rule relevant only m the context of race.9" Against this
(N.Y App. Div 1990) (concluding that Batson applies to sex-based challenges); State v
Burch, 830 P.2d 357, 362-63 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (concluding that sex-based challenges
violate state and federal constitutions).
94. See United States v Broussard, 987 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1993) (refusing to
extend Batson to sex-based strikes); United States v Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038, 1042-43 (4th
Cir. 1988) (same), cert. dismissed sub nom. Washington v United States, 489 U.S. 1094
(1989), and cert. demed, 493 U.S. 1069 (1990); cf. United States v Nichols, 937 F.2d 1257,
1262 (7th Cir. 1991) (declining to recognize black women as cognizable group for purposes
of Batson challenge), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1080 (1992).
95. See Stariks v State, 572 So. 2d 1301, 1303 (Ala. Cnm. App. 1991) (declining to
extend Batson to sex-based peremptory challenges); Hannan v Commonwealth, 774 S.W.2d
462, 464 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989) (concluding that Batson offers no authority for prohibiting sex-
based challenges); State v. Clay, 779 S.W.2d 673, 676 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (concluding that
Batson does not apply to sex-based challenges); State v Culver, 444 N.W.2d 662, 666 (Neb.
1989) (declining to extend Batson to sex-based challenges); State v Oliviera, 534 A.2d 867,
870 (R.I. 1987) (same).
96. See Georgia v McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 44-45 (1992) (considering ability of
criminal defendant to exclude all black venire members); Edmonson v Leesville Concrete
Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991) (assessing civil litigant's use of two of three peremptory
challenges to exclude black venire members); Powers v Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 403 (1991)
(evaluating use of seven of ten peremptory challenges to remove black venire members).
97 See McCollum, 505 U.S. at 59 (stating Court's holding in McCollum). The
McCollum Court explained, "Mhe Constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging
in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges."
Id. (emphasis added); see also Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 630 (discussing Court's holding). The
Edmonson Court summarized its holding as follows: "We conclude that courts must entertain
a challenge to a private litigant's racially discrinnmatory use of peremptory challenges m a
civil trial." Id. (emphasis added); see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (discussing test for
assessing peremptory challenges). In outlining the test to evaluate a state's peremptory
strikes, the Batson Court explained that a defendant had to establish membership m a
"cognizable racial group." Id. (emphasis added).
98. Brown v. North Carolina, 479 U.S. 940, 941-42 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in denial of certiorari). Describing Batson, Justice O'Connor explained: "[Batson] is a
special rule of relevance, a statement about what this Nation stands for, rather than a state-
ment of fact. In my view, that special rule is a product of the unique history of racial
discrimination in this country; it should not be divorced from that context." Id. at 942. But
see infra notes 126-32 and accompanying text (discussing Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion in J.E.B., approving of extension of Batson to sex-based peremptory challenges).
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background, J.E.B. represented a decisive break with Batson and its
progeny "
III. J.E.B. v Alabama ex rel. T.B.
A. The Facts
In 1991, Alabama filed a paternity suit on behalf of T.B., an unwed
mother, against J.E.B., the putative father."° The court selected a thirty-six
person venire, twelve of whom were men. 101 After challenges for cause
eliminated two men and one woman, Alabama exercised nine of its ten per-
emptory strikes against male jury panelists; the defendant struck the sole
remaining male and exercised his ten remaining challenges against female
jury panelists - which resulted m an all-woman jury "
J.E.B. challenged Alabama's use of peremptory strikes as a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause and asked the trial court to extend Batson's
protections to sex. 03 The trial court refused, and the trial proceeded with
the all-woman jury, which returned a verdict establishing J.E.B.'s pater-
nity 104 J.E.B., through a post-judgment motion, renewed his argument that
Batson should apply to sex, but the trial court reaffirmed its earlier ruling. 0
The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals, relying on state precedent, affirmed
the judgment,"6 and the Alabama Supreme Court denied certiorari.10 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.108
99. Cf. Puszis, supra note 59, at 51-52 (explaining that Court's extension of Batson to
sex-based challenges is questionable). But see Thomas A. Hett, Batson v Kentucky: Present
Extensions and Future Applications, 24 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 413, 429-31 (1993) (arguing that
prior Court decisions and federal statutory law indicate possible future application of Batson
to sex-based challenges).
100. J.E.B. v Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1421 (1994).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1421-22.
103. Id. at 1422.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. J.E.B. v State ex rel. T.B., 606 So. 2d 156, 157 (Ala. Civ App. 1992), rev'd,
J.E.B. v Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994). In refusing J.E.B.'s request, the
Alabama Court of Civil Appeals relied on prior decisions by the Alabama Court of Criminal
Appeals and the Alabama Supreme Court. Id. at 157 (citations omitted).
107 J.E.B. v State ex rel. T.B., No. 1911717 (Ala. Oct. 23, 1992).
108. J.E.B. v Alabama ex rel. T.B., 113 S. Ct. 2330 (1993).
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B. The Majority Opinion
Justice Blackmun, for the majority," ° began by recounting the long is-
tory of discriminatory treatment of women in the selection of jury panels.11
Initially, society perceived women as too "fragile and virginal" for court-
rooms."1 Court decisions, however, eventually recogmzed that diversity on
the jury assured impartiality, and consequently, these decisions allocated the
civic duty of jury service to more citizens.112
The majority then explained that the state's use of sex-based strikes was
a classification that had to survive heightened scrutiny - that is, the strikes
had to further substantially the state's legitimate interest in securing a fair
and impartial jury "1 The long history of discrimination against women in
America, the majority explained, justified this level of scrutiny 14 Alabama
argued that a historical perception that men favor putative fathers and that
women favor mothers in paternity suits justified the sex-based strikes."' The
majority, refusing to accept as a justification for sex-based peremptory chal-
lenges "the very stereotype the law condemns," rejected this argument."
6
Because Alabama could not prove that sex accurately predicted venire mem-
bers' attitudes, Alabama could not show that a sex-based strike substantially
furthered the goal of securing an impartial jury 117
109. J.E.B. v Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1421 (1994). Justices Stevens,
O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg joined Justice Blackmun's opinion; Justice O'Connor filed
a concurring opinion; Justice Kennedy filed an opinion concurring m the judgment. Id.
110. Id. at 1422-24.
111. Id. at 1423.
112. Id. at 1424 (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975)). In Taylor, the Court
rejected an "affirmative registration" statute for women seeking to participate in the jury
system. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 533-35.
113. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1424-26; see Craig v Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976)
(requiring that sex classification serve important governmental objectives and be substantially
related to achieving those objectives); infra notes 154-59 and accompanying text (discussing
different standards of review under Equal Protection Clause).
114. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1425 (citing Frontiero v Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684
(1973), for rationale for giving sex classifications heightened scrutiny).
115. Respondent's Brief on the Merits at *10, J.E.B. v Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S.
Ct. 1419 (1994) (No. 92-1239).
116. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1426 (quoting Powers v Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991)).
Justice Blackmun explained that Alabama's arguments were similar to arguments supporting
the statutory exclusion of women from venires and, therefore, were inherently suspect. Id.
at 1426-27
117 Id. The majority also suggested that statistical proof supporting Alabama's conten-
tion that the historical perception was a good predictor of a juror's sympathies would not
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Instead, the majority explained, a sex-based strike implicated the Bat-
son harms11 because such challenges reinforced stereotypes and preju-
dices.119 The Court explained that a sex-based strike harmed the defendant
because prejudices might pervade the entire trial. 20 Furthermore, a sex-
based challenge violated a jury panelist's right to nondiscriminatory jury
selection practices."' Finally, a sex-based strike harmed the whole com-
munity and undermined public confidence m the judicial system by placing
the state's imprimatur on outdated stereotypes." 2
The J.E.B. majority explained that its decision did not eliminate the
peremptory challenge because parties could still use the strike against any
group subject to "rational basis" scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause."Z Furthermore, careful questioning of venire members during voir
dire would permit attorneys to develop sufficiently sex-neutral reasons to
justify their strikes.124 Justice Blackmun concluded his analysis by adopt-
ing, as the standard for sex discrimination, Batson's three-part test for
evaluating a party's allegation of intentional discrimination in the exercise
of peremptory challenges."
C. The Concumng Opinions
Justice O'Connor, concurring, explained that Batson had already
created administrative difficulties for lower courts and speculated that
J.E.B. would only exacerbate the problems of jury selection. 26 Justice
O'Connor detailed the historical importance of the peremptory challenge
enable sex-based strikes to survive heightened scrutiny Id. at 1427 n. 11.
118. Batson v Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87-88 (1986) (discussing harms of racially
discriminatory peremptory strikes); see supra note 38 (discussing Batson harms).
119. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1427-28.
120. Id. at 1427
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1429; see infra note 158 and accompanying text (defining rational basis
scrutiny under Equal Protection Clause). The majority also suggested that a peremptory
strike based on a common sex characteristic - such as military service for men or nursing
for women - would be constitutional. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429 n.16.
124. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429.
125. Id. at 1429-30 (citing Batson v Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 (1986)); see also
supra notes 35-41 (discussing Batson). In other words, courts will now require litigants to
produce sex-neutral reasons for peremptory challenges to rebut a prima facie case of sex
discrimnation. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429-30.
126. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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and its value in securing an impartial jury 127 J.E.B. would hurt the
peremptory challenge, Justice O'Connor explained, because additional
constitutional restrictions would make it even more difficult to justify a
strike that, by definition, needed no justification." Because of the rele-
vance of race and sex in jury deliberations, peremptory strikes based on
assumptions about a man's or woman's likely predisposition in a particular
case would assist a litigant in securing an impartial jury 129 Justice
O'Connor, however, acknowledged that J.E.B. made these often factually
accurate assumptions irrelevant as a matter of constitutional law 130 Thus,
Batson's special rule for race now governed sex as well."' Finally, Justice
O'Connor argued that the Court should limit J.E.B. to its facts and thereby
allow criminal defendants and civil litigants to exercise sex-based peremp-
tory strikes without constitutional scrutiny 132
Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment of the Court, explained
that J.E.B. was merely a logical outgrowth of Supreme Court precedents."'
For Justice Kennedy, the only question was whether a sex-based strike
could survive heightened scrutiny 134 Emphasizing the Equal Protection
Clause's emphasis on individual rights, Justice Kennedy argued that the
injury that a sex-based strike caused did not differ from the injury that a
statute that banned either men or women from a vemre would cause.
135
Justice Kennedy concluded that because sex-based peremptory challenges
assess the juror on group characteristics - rather than on individual
127 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
128. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
130. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
131. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 1432-33 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor's proposed limitation
to the Court's holding in J.E.B. is consistent with her prior opinions. See Georgia v
McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 66-68 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that criminal
defendant is not state actor when exercising peremptory challenges); Edmonson v Leesville
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 644 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that civil litigant
is not state actor when exercising peremptory challenges). In addition, Justice O'Connor no
doubt proposed this limitation out of concern for the future of the challenge; as she explained,
"In extending Batson to gender we have taken a step closer to eliminating" peremptory
challenges. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
133. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1433 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
134. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy explained that earlier cases had
established beyond doubt that the Equal Protection Clause applied to both race and sex dis-
crimmation. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 1434 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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fitness - sex-based strikes do not comport with the Equal Protection
Clause. '3
D. The Dissenting Opinions
Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissenting,'37 argued that the differences
between race and sex discrninnation justified limiting Batson to race-based
peremptory strikes. '38 The Chief Justice explained that in Batson, the Court
balanced the peremptory challenge - and the values that it serves - against
the dictates of the Equal Protection Clause.139 Batson simply recogmzed that
the Fourteenth Amendment is essentially about race, so the balance tipped
against peremptory challenges in the race context."' Differences between
the sexes do contribute to a difference in "outlook brought to the jury
room"; therefore, the balance should tip in favor of sex-based strikes
because they substantially further the state's interest m securing an impartial
jury 141
Justice Scalia authored a caustic dissent that criticized the majority's po-
litical correctness in denouncing male chauvinism and discrimination against
women in a case in which the equal protection challenge centered on per-
emptory strikes exercised against male vemre members.142 Justice Scalia
began by attacking the majority's contention that the excluded jurors suffered
an injury and argued that because the majority believed that male and female
jurors were interchangeable for purposes of the petit jury, J.E.B. could not
have suffered an injury 143 Justice Scalia also disagreed with the majority's
contention that group-based strikes were inherently unconstitutional and
argued that because any party can strike either sex - and in this case, the
parties did strike both sexes in equal numbers - the jury selection system
did not discriminate as a whole; in using sex-based strikes, each party simply
attempts to secure a jury that favors that party's side.1" Finally, Justice
136. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
137 Id. at 1434-36 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist also joined
Justice Scalia's dissent. Id. at 1436 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 1434-35 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 1435 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
140. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
141. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 1436-38 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 1436-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia argued that J.E.B. did not
suffer an injury but conceded that J.E.B. probably had standing under Powers to raise the
claim of an excluded juror. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 1437 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Scalia argued that the majority's reasoning placed all peremptory challenges
based on group characteristics at risk because parties base all challenges on
stereotypes.14 Under the majority's rationale, no peremptory challenge
could ever satisfy the heightened scrutiny or rational basis equal protection
tests because of the Court's refusal to accept a justification based on a stereo-
type." Justice Scalia observed that the Court's decision would hurt criminal
defendants because such defendants would be almost completely unable to
challenge possibly biased jurors.' 47 He also noted that the additional admm-
istrative costs would harm the justice system."4 The Court's decision,
Justice Scalia concluded, seriously and unnecessarily damaged an essential
trial practice.' 49
IV Analysis
J.E.B.'s conclusion that sex-based peremptory challenges are unconsti-
tutional is incorrect for two reasons. First, the Court mischaracterized the
state's use of challenges as a sex-based classification subject to heightened
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.'o This error will erode the
challenge's viability because every peremptory challenge is now potentially
an act of sex discrimination." Second, the J.E.B. Court disregarded Court
precedent that clearly indicated that only a history of abuse in the exercise
of the peremptory challenge justifies subjecting any given peremptory
challenge in a single case to equal protection scrutiny " Because no history
145. Id. at 1438 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
146. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Powers v Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991)).
147 Id. at 1438 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 1439 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
149. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia observed:
In order, it seems to me, not to eliminate any real denial of equal protection, but
simply to pay conspicuous obeisance to the equality of the sexes, the Court
imperils a practice that has been considered an essential part of fair jury trial since
the dawn of the common law. The Constitution of the United States neither
requires nor permits this vandalizing of our people's traditions.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
150. See nfra notes 165-76 and accompanying text (arguing that peremptory challenge
system does not classify on basis of sex).
151. See infra notes 177-80 and accompanying text (discussing implications of J.E.B.
Court's mischaracterization).
152. See infra notes 181-210 and accompanying text (discussing Court precedent
indicating that pattern of abuse is required before giving constitutional scrutiny to peremptory
challenges in individual case).
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of abuse exists m the context of sex, the Court has provided a remedy for a
nonexistent problem - a remedy that seriously undermines an Important trial
tool. 153
A. Sex Classifications
The Equal Protection Clause generally prevents states from treating
similarly situated groups of people differently "5 In enacting legislation, a
state can classify people, as long as the state does not base the classification
on arbitrary factors.'55 Courts subject classifications to different levels of
judicial scrutiny depending on the basis for the classification."s For exam-
ple, courts view state-made distinctions based on race, ethnicity, or national
origin as inherently suspect and review those distinctions under a "strict
scrutiny" test."" Courts examine classifications m the context of economic
and social welfare legislation, on the other hand, under a more deferential
"rational basis test." ''"8 Finally, courts view sex-based classifications as
quasi-suspect and review them under an intermediate or "heightened scru-
tiny" standard. 
159
153. See mfra notes 222-29 and accompanying text (discussing implications of J.E.B. and
possible extensions).
154. See Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 31 (1879) (stating purpose of Equal Protection
Clause). The Lewis Court explained that the Clause means that "no person or class of persons
shall be denied the same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other
classes in the same place and under like circumstances." Id.
155. See JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTrruTiONAL LAw § 14.2 (5th ed. 1995)
(explaining limits on state's ability to draw classifications).
156. See mnfra notes 157-59 and accompanying text (describing different levels of
scrutiny under Equal Protection Clause).
157 See Palmore v Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-34 (1984) (applying strict scrutiny to
race-based child custody determination); Loving v Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967)
(applying strict scrutiny to statutory scheme prohibiting interracial marriages). The state must
have a compelling interest justifying the differential treatment, and the state must narrowly
tailor the classification to advance that interest. See Palnore, 466 U.S. at 432-33 (defining
strict scrutiny).
158. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11-17 (1992) (applying rational basis scrutiny
to state proposition requiring state to treat residents who purchased property prior to proposi-
tion's enactment differently than residents who purchased property after proposition's enact-
ment in assessing property taxes); City of New Orleans v Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-06
(1976) (applying rational basis scrutiny to city ordinance exempting certain street vendors
from general prohibition on such vendors). Under rational basis, courts determine whether
a legitimate state interest exists and whether the classification is rationally related to the
furtherance of that interest. See Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 11 (defining rational basis scrutiny);
Dukes, 427 U.S. at 303-04 (same)).
159. See Mississippi Umv. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 727-33 (1982) (applying
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To challenge state action under the Equal Protection Clause, a party
must initially prove the existence of a classification.1" Such differential
treatment by a state actor typically manifests itself m one of three ways: The
state action discriminates on its face,' in its application, 2 or by design.163
Peremptory challenges are an example of state acts that can discriminate in
their application because challenges are neutral on their face and do not
discriminate by design, but litigants can apply them m a discriminatory
fashion. 64
In J.E.B., the Court erroneously characterized the state's use of per-
emptory challenges as a sex-based classification subject to equal protection
scrutiny 1 J.E.B. argued that the state's use of peremptory challenges to
remove nine of the ten men on the jury panel was unconstitutional sex dis-
crimmation. 1  However, J.E.B. used ten of Ins eleven strikes to eliminate
women from the same panel.'67 Thus, J.E.B., a state actor under Ed-
monson, 6 ' also discriminated on the basis of sex. As a practical matter, the
heightened scrutiny to state-supported, all-women nursing school); Craig v Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 199-210 (1976) (applying heightened scrutiny to state statute that treated 18-20 year-old
males differently than 18-20 year-old females with respect to purchase of 3.2% beer). Under
heightened scrutiny, a state must prove that the classification advances an important
government interest, and the classification must be substantially related to furthering that
interest. See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 723-27 (defining heightened scrutiny); Craig, 429 U.S. at
197-99 (same).
160. See NoWAK ET AL., supra note 155, § 14.2 (explaining that classification of
similarly situated individuals resulting m differential treatment triggers Equal Protection
Clause).
161. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1954) (involving state statutes
mandating racial segregation in public education).
162. See Palmore v. Sidot, 466 U.S. 429, 430-31 (1984) (involving child-custody court
order applying race-neutral state law m racially discriminatory fashion); cf. Korematsu v
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215-17 (1944) (involving discriminatory application of race-
neutral Executive Order).
163. See Hunter v Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229-30 (1985) (involving state statute
designed and enacted to disenfranchise black citizens).
164. See Batson v Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) (explaining that peremptory
challenges give those with discriminatory motives ability to discriminate).
165. See infra notes 166-76 and accompanying text (criticizing characterization of
peremptory challenges m J.E.B. as sex-based classification).
166. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at *6-7, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct.
1419 (1994) (No. 92-1239).
167 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422.
168. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 627-28 (1991) (explaining
that civil litigant is state actor when exercising peremptory challenges).
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only difference between J.E.B.'s actions and the state's actions was that the
state discriminated against men and J.E.B. discrminated against women.'69
As a matter of constitutional law, however, the peremptory challenge
system did not classify between the sexes m tins case. 170 Men and women
each represent approximately one half of the population, so any given venire
will roughly reflect that equality 17' For the purposes of selecting the petit
jury then, men and women are similarly situated on the jury panel. And
because the peremptory challenge system subjects all potential jurors to the
same possibility of arbitrary removal from the panel, the system as a whole
does not treat men and women differently "7 Indeed, J.E.B. demonstrates
the fact that the system does not classify between men and women; in this
case, both sides struck men and women in almost identical proportions. 173
The fact that J.E.B. ended up facing an all-female jury is simply the product
of a disproportionately high number of women venire members 74 - quite
literally, the luck of the jury panel draw 175 Surprisingly, Alabama did not
raise this argument, although one anucus party seems to have realized the
argument's potential. 176
169. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1421-22. Of course, in exercising its strikes, the state acted
on behalf of a woman - T.B., the mother m the paternity suit. Id. at 1421.
170. Cy. rd. at 1437 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that sex-based strikes do not violate
Equal Protection Clause because peremptory challenge system treats both sexes even-
handedly).
171. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION - GENERAL POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS:
UNITED STATES tbl. 14, at 19-20 (showing that men represent 48.7% and women 51.3% of
population of United States).
172. See Swam v Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 221 (1965) (explaining that peremptory chal-
lenge system subjects all venire members to equal possibility of removal), overruled in part,
Batson v Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
173. J.E.B. v Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1421-22 (1994) (describing
exercise of peremptory challenges in case). J.E.B. used 91 % of his strikes against women,
and Alabama used 90% of its strikes against men. See id.
174. See id. at 1421 (stating that venire in J.E.B.'s case consisted of 24 women and 12
men).
175. See United States v. Broussard, 987 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1993) (arguing that
because women are not numerical minorities, sex-based peremptory challenges are unprac-
ticable). The Fifth Circuit explained that the fact that "women are not numerical minorities
looms large because the focus of Batson is upon selecting a petit jury from a randomly chosen
venire. This means that striking women, or men, for the sole reason of their sex cannot
succeed except in isolated cases." Id. at 220. J.E.B. was one of those isolated cases.
176. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at *28-29,
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994) (No. 92-1239) (implicitly recognizing
value of focusing on one party's exercise of peremptory challenges). The United States
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Unfortunately, the J.E.B. Court also was not aware of this analytical
approach."7 Consequently, litigants can now challenge every single strike
by an opposing party as an act of sex discrinnation.178 Because the per-
emptory challenge functions best when free of judicial regulation,179 J.E.B. 's
expansion of the number of strikes subject to judicial scrutiny seriously
erodes the challenge's effectiveness. 180
B. History of Abuse
Prior to Swain, the Supreme Court never directly addressed the consti-
tutionality of peremptory challenges."' 1 In 1879, however, the Court began
applying the Equal Protection Clause to state jury selection procedures and
held that a West Virgina statute limiting the class of persons eligible for jury
service to white males constituted a demal of equal protection." The Court
carefully worded the description of the parties' exercise of peremptory challenges m J.E.B..
"The State used nine of its 10 peremptory strikes to remove male jurors; petitioner used one
of his 11 strikes to remove a male juror." Id. Of course, if petitioner used only one strike
against a male jury panelist, by definition he used 10 of his 11 strikes against female jury
panelists. Thus, the United States, though supporting J.E.B., may have realized that a char-
acterization of peremptory challenges in this case as a classification required focusing solely
on one of the parties' challenges and not both.
177 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1424-26 (analyzing state's exercise of peremptory challenges
as sex-based classification).
178. Every vemre member is a man or woman, and because the Court considers both
men and women to be cognizable groups under the Fourteenth Amendment, see Mississippi
Univ for Women v Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24 (1982) (explaining that courts give
discrimination against either men or women same level of scrutiny under Equal Protection
Clause), every peremptory strike removes a cognmzable group member and is therefore chal-
lengeable by the nonstriking party.
179. See infra note 194 and accompanying text (explaining that peremptory challenge
works best when court interference is nmmal).
180. See nfra notes 213-31 and accompanying text (discussing how J.E.B. will erode
peremptory challenge).
181. See McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1118 (2d Cir. 1984) (explaining that Swain
is only Supreme Court case to directly address constitutionality of state's exercise of race-
based peremptory challenges), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986);
see also supra notes 26-34 and accompanying text (discussing Swain).
182. See Strauder v West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879) (concluding that state
statute limiting jury service to white men denied black defendant equal protection of laws).
The defendant in Strauder challenged both the grand jury and the petit jury panel in his case.
Id. at 304-05. However, the Court couched its holding in broad terms, failing to specify
whether the Equal Protection Clause governed the selection of individual petit jurors: "Mhe
statute of West Virginia, discriminating in the selection of jurors, as it does, against negroes
because of their color, amounts to a denial of the equal protection of the laws to a colored
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quickly expanded this principle to forbid officials charged with administering
grand jury and venire selection procedures from systematically excluding
members of the defendant's race in selecting grand or petit jury panels."i
Subsequent cases consistently reaffirmed this nondiscrimination principle.'14
However, at the time the Court decided Swam, a criminal defendant had to
show a pattern of discrinmatory behavior in selecting the grand or petit jury
venire to establish an equal protection violation."a Defendants could not
rely on the facts of their own cases to satisfy the evidentiary burden."6
man when he is put upon trial for an alleged offence against the State." Id. at 310.
183. See Neal v Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 394 (1880) (explaining that defendant has
right to jurors selected without racially discrimmatory practices); Virginia v Rives, 100 U.S.
313, 322-23 (1879) (same).
184. See Arnold v North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773, 774 (1964) (reversing conviction
because of systematic exclusion of blacks from grand juries); Eubanks v Louisiana, 356 U.S.
584, 585-86, 589 (1958) (reversing conviction because of systematic exclusion of blacks by
jury commission from grand juries); Hernandez v Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 480-82 (1954)
(reversing conviction because of systematic exclusion by state against Mexicans m selection
of grand juries and petit jury panels); Cassell v Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 287-90 (1950) (plur-
ality opinion) (reversing conviction because of racial discrimination in selection of grand
jurors in defendant's case); Hill v Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 404 (1942) (reversing conviction
because of systematic exclusion by jury commissioners of blacks from grand juries); Smith
v Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 131-32 (1940) (same); Rogers v Alabama, 192 U.S. 226, 229-31
(1904) (same); Carter v Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 447-49 (1900) (same); C. Reece v Georgia,
350 U.S. 85, 87-90 (1955) (stating that allegation of discriminatory administration of facially
race-neutral grand jury statutory selection scheme stated constitutional claim).
185. See, e.g., Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584, 587 (1958) (requiring that criminal
defendant show complete and continuous exclusion of blacks by jury selection plan m
selecting grand juries); Hernandez v Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 480-81 (1954) (requiring that
criminal defendant establish pattern of exclusion of Mexicans by state in selecting citizens for
jury service); Patton v Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463, 465-66 (1947) (requiring that criminal
defendant prove systematic exclusion of blacks by jury administration officials in selecting
grand juries and petit jury venires); Hill v Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 404-06 (1942) (explaining
that criminal defendant must establish continuous exclusion of blacks by jury commissioners
in selecting grand juries); Hale v Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613, 616 (1938) (requirmg that crim-
inal defendant show systematic and arbitrary exclusion of blacks by state in selecting citizens
forjury service); Norris v Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 596-99 (1935) (explaming that criminal
defendant established prima facie case of racial discrimination in selection of grand juries and
petit jury venires).
186. But see Cassell v Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 290 (1950) (plurality opinion) (reversing
denial of motion to quash indictment because of discrimination in selection of grand jury).
In Cassell, four members of the Court suggested that a defendant could establish a prima facie
case of racial discrimination m the state's administration of a jury selection system by using
the facts of his own case. Id. However, the other three justices m the majority concurred
only in the judgment, citing a history of discrimination in the selection of names for grand
jury lists. Id. at 294-95. The Court later adopted the Cassell approach and permitted defend-
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Some members of the Court argued that the nondiscrimination principle
m these early cases applied to all jury selection procedures, including the
peremptory challenge.1" Indeed,, several of the prior cases contain broad
language that seems to support this interpretation.'B However, none of these
cases mentioned peremptory strikes or involved a challenge to the exercise
ants to challenge the selection of the venire or panel based on the facts of their particular
case. See Batson v Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 95 (1986) (reaffirming that defendant need not
prove discrunminatory pattern m venire selection to establish Equal Protection Clause viola-
tion).
187 See Swain v Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 239 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting)
(arguing that majority misconstrued prior Court cases on jury selection procedures), over-
ruled in part, Batson v Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). In his dissent, Justice Goldberg
wrote:
The Court's jury decisions, read together, have never distinguished between
exclusion from the jury panel and exclusion from the jury itself. The very
point of all these cases is to prevent that deliberate and systematic discrimnation
against Negroes or any other racial group that would prevent them, not merely
from being placed on the panel, but from serving on the jury.
Id. (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Justice White's majority opinion m Swain cited similarly broad language. Id. at 203-04.
However, Justice White ultimately treated the peremptory challenge differently, refusing to
"woodenly appl[y]," id. at 227, the test developed m prior cases to the peremptory challenge.
Id. at 221-22, 226-28.
188. See, e.g., Eubanks v Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584, 585 (1958) (explaining that indict-
ment by grand jury or trial by petit jury where state excludes members of defendant's race
constitutes denial of equal protection); Patton v Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463, 465 (1947) (ex-
plaining that state's race-based exclusion of blacks from grand and petit juries violates Equal
Protection Clause); Martin v Texas, 200 U.S. 316, 321 (1906) (describing, in expansive
terms, constitutional right of accused concerning jury selection); Virgina v Rives, 100 U.S.
313, 322-23 (1879) (concluding that discrimination based on race in selection of jurors vio-
lates Equal Protection Clause); supra note 182 (quoting Strauder v West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303 (1879)). For example, the Martin Court wrote: "What an accused is entitled to demand
is that in organizing the grand jury as well as in the empaneling of the petit jury, there
shall be no exclusion of his race, and no discrimination against them, because of their race
or color." Martin, 200 U.S. at 321.
In addition to case law prohibiting discrimination in jury selection, a federal statute pro-
hibited both states and the federal government from disqualifymg or deliberately excluding
any citizen from grand or petit jury service based on the potential juror's race. Civil Rights
Act of 1875, ch. 114, § 4, 18 Stat. 336-37 (1875) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 243
(1994)). The statute provided that violations constituted misdemeanor offenses and were pun-
ishable by fines up to $5,000. Id. Four years after its enactment, the Supreme Court enter-
tained a constitutional challenge to the statute by a state judge indicted for violating the
statute's provisions; the Court sustained the statute's constitutionality under the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments. & Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 340, 344-49 (1879) (denying writ
of habeas corpus to state judge indicted under Civil Rights Act of 1875 and affirming Act's
constitutionality).
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of such strikes."89 In addition, the Court's approach to peremptory challenges
in Batson suggests that twenty-one years after Swain, the Court still treated the
venire selection cases as only persuasive authority that did not directly control
equal protection challenges to petit jury selection procedures like peremptory
strikes. iSo
However, in cases decided prior to and contemporaneously with the
venire selection cases, the Court extolled the virtues of the peremptory chal-
lenge.191 The Court explained that the challenge enabled litigants to eliminate
potentially biased jurors and allowed both parties to secure an impartial jury '92
189. See McCray v Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1118 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that Swain
is only Supreme Court opinion to directly address constitutionality of race-based peremptory
challenges), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986); cf. Reece v Geor-
gia, 350 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1955) (involving grand jury selection practices); Patton v Mississip-
pi, 332 U.S. 463, 464-65 (1947) (involving grand jury and petit jury selection practices);
Hale v Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613, 614-15 (1938) (involving grand jury selection practices);
Martin v Texas, 200 U.S. 316, 318 (1906) (same); Gibson v Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 584
(1896) (same). This lack of equal protection challenges to peremptory strikes is due to the
fact that the Court did not consider the Equal Protection Clause as governing peremptory
challenges. See Gibson v Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 580-81 (1896) (citing expansive
examples of equal protection violations but excluding use of peremptory challenge). The
Gbson Court summaiized the jury selection cases as follows: "[]o compel a [black] man to
submit to a trial before a jury drawn from a panel from which were excluded, because of
their color, men of his race was a denial of the equal protection of the laws " Id.
at 581 (emphasis added).
190. See Batson v Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) (analogizing petit jury selection
to selection of vemre). The Batson Court analyzed venire selection cases decided after Swain
and concluded that a criminal defendant no longer had to show a pattern of discrimination but
could rely on the facts of his case to challenge venire selection procedures. Id. The Batson
Court then argued, by analogy, that the principles of those cases supported the Court's con-
clusion that defendants could rely on the exercise of peremptory challenges in their individual
case to establish purposeful discrumiation. Id. at 96. Thus, the Court, in 1986, continued
to distinguish the selection of the jury panel from the selection of the petit jury m the context
of the Equal Protection Clause.
191. See Pointer v United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894) (describing peremptory
challenge as one of defendant's most important rights); Lewis v United States, 146 U.S. 370,
376 (1892) (describing peremptory challenge as essential to system of trial by jury); Hayes
v Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887) (describing peremptory strike as one of most effective
means of eliminating unfitjurors). In more recent cases, the Court has continued to acknowl-
edge the importance of the challenge, though not quite as vigorously See J.E.B. v Alabama
ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1429 (1994) (explaining that state has legitimate interest in
using peremptory challenge to secure fair and impartial jury); Georgia v McCollum, 505
U.S. 42, 57 (1992) (describing peremptory strike as one way to achieve impartial jury and
fair trial); Batson v Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98-99 (1986) (describing peremptory strike as
important part of trial procedure).
192. See Holland v Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 481-83 (1990) (describing peremptory
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For example, the Court reversed convictions in which trial courts denied or
abridged the exercise of a peremptory challenge.193 The Court noted that if a
party could not exercise the challenge free of judicial regulation, the strike
would be useless."w
Thus, the jury selection and peremptory challenge cases appear inconsis-
tent; the Court provided constitutional protection, with an attending reversible
error rule, for a practice that the Constitution does not require1 95 and that has
the inherent potential for discriminatory use.19 Swain clarified this apparent
conflict by striking a balance between the peremptory challenge and the Equal
Protection Clause. 19' In Swain, the Court concluded that the Clause did not
challenge as tool that litigants historically used to secure an impartial jury); United States v
Marchant, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 297, 298 (1827) (explaining that right of peremptory
challenge permits criminal defendant "to say who shall not try him"). In Swain, the Court
suggested another goal that the challenge furthered:
The function of the challenge is not only to eliminate extremes of partiality on
both sides, but to assure the parties that the jurors before whom they try the case
will decide on the basis of the evidence placed before them, and not otherwise.
In this way, the peremptory satisfies the rule that "to perform its high function in
the best way 'justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.'"
Swam v Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136
(1955)), overruled inpart, Batson v Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
193. See Harrison v United States, 163 U.S. 140, 141-42 (1896) (reversing conviction
because trial court denied defendant full number of peremptory challenges); Lewis v United
States, 146 U.S. 370, 378-80 (1892) (reversing conviction because venire members were not
present in courtroom when defendant exercised challenges and because trial court deprived
him of three challenges); cf. Gulf, Colo. & S. Fe Ry. v Shane, 157 U.S. 348, 351 (1895)
(reversing verdict of negligence because trial court denied defendant ability to strike jurors
from venire panel); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 293-94 (1892) (ordering
new trial because trial court denied defendants their full right of peremptory challenge).
194. See St. Clair v. United States, 154 U.S. 134, 148 (1894) (condemning jury selection
system that prevents defendant from exercising peremptory challenges without restriction);
Lewis v United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376-78 (1892) (explaining that courts must give
defendant freedom to exercise challenge). The Lewis Court explained that the challenge is
by definition arbitrary and that "it must be exercised with full freedom, or it fails of its full
purpose." Id. at 378 (quoting Lamb v State, 36 Wis. 424, 427 (1874)); cf. United States v
Shackleford, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 588, 589-90 (1855) (explaining that judge has no discre-
tionary authority to deny peremptory challenges to any party m any case).
195. See Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919) (explaining that Constitution
does not require either states or Congress to provide peremptory challenges to any party m
court).
196. See Batson v Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) (quoting Avery v Georgia, 345
U.S. 559, 562 (1953)) ("Peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that
permits 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.'").
197 Swam v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,221-22, 224-28 (1965), overruled in part, Batson
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govern a party's use of challenges m an individual case but mght govern the
use of challenges if a defendant could show a pattern of abuse across several
cases. 1
98
Twenty-one years after Swain, however, the Batson Court rejected this
burden of proof as "crippling" and impossible to meet. 199 The Batson Court
arrived at this conclusion after finding that states flagrantly abused peremp-
tory challenges.2'" In other words, because states continued to use peremp-
tory challenges to strike black vemre members in large numbers m case after
case, the Batson Court refused to continue presuming that a state exercised
any given challenge to secure a fair and impartial jury 201 Thus, Batson pro-
vides an example of the Court responding to practical realities; jury selection
practices in the country exposed Swain's presumption, m the race context,
as wholly arbitrary and irrational. This interpretation of Batson explains
the vote shift of Justice White, who authored Swain' 3 but voted with the
Batson majority ' In his Batson concurrence, Justice White explained that
v Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); see supra notes 26-34 and accompanying text (discussing
Swain).
198. Swain, 380 U.S. at 221-28.
199. Batson, 476 U.S. at 92-93; see supra notes 31-33 (citing criticism of Swain's evi-
dentiary standard).
200. Batson, 476 U.S. at 92-93 & nn.16-17; see supra notes 31-33 (citing cases and
commentary documenting difficulty of establishing equal protection violation under Swain).
201. See Batson v Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) (permitting defendant to show
intentional discrimination m selection of petit jury "solely on evidence concerning the prose-
cutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial"); id. at 103-04 & n.2
(Marshall, J., concurring) (documenting abuse of peremptory challenge against black vemre
members).
202. C. Broussard v United States, 987 F.2d 215, 218-20 (5th Cir. 1993) (arguing that
experience demonstrated that Swain's presumption - that any particular peremptory chal-
lenge is not based on race - was incorrect).
203. Swain v Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 203 (1965), overruled in part, Batson v
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
204. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 100-02 (White, J., concurring). Throughout his career on
the Court, Justice White adopted a realistic approach to cases and demonstrated a firm con-
viction that "law should reflect a pragmatic appraisal of the circumstances to which the law
is to be applied." Allan P Ides, The Jurisprudence of Byron White, 103 YALE L.J. 419, 456
(1993) (discussing legal realism in Justice White's jurisprudence). Justice Brennan also
joined both the Swain and Batson majorities. Swain, 380 U.S. at 228; Batson, 476 U.S. at
81, 108. However, his vote shift reflected a more fundamental change of philosophy Dis-
senting from the Court's denial of certiorari in a pre-Batson case, Justice Brennan explained
that Swain's equal protection reasoning was incorrect because Swain umpermissibly allowed
prosecutors to presume that black jurors would be partial to black defendants simply because
of the racial correlation. See Thompson v United States, 469 U.S. 1024, 1025-27 (1984)
1758
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
prosecutors should have taken Swain as a warning that race-based peremp-
tory strikes might violate the Equal Protection Clause.'
Batson therefore stands for the proposition that only a history of abuse
m the exercise of peremptory challenges justifies relaxing Swain's pattern-of-
abuse evidentiary requirement.' Batson overruled Swain only to the extent
that Swain permitted race-based peremptory challenges in a particular case
to avoid constitutional scrutiny ' Swain should still provide the appropriate
standard for assessing a party's exercise of peremptory challenges based on
sex or any other nonracial characteristic.s Other cognizable groups must
demonstrate a pattern of abuse of peremptory challenges m case after case
to receive Batson's protection.' As a matter of constitutional law, the
(Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (criticizing Swain).
205. Batson, 476 U.S. at 100-01 (White, J., concurring). Justice White explained: "It
appears, however, that the practice of peremptorily eliminating blacks from petit juries m
cases with black defendants remains widespread, so much so that I agree that an opportunity
to inquire should be afforded when this occurs." Id. at 101.
206. See Broussard, 987 F.2d at 218-20 (arguing that practical necessity justified
Batson's result). The Fifth Circuit explained, "[It was experience and functional necessity -
not analogical reasoning that decided Batson " Id. at 220.
207 See Batson v Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100-01 (1986) (White, J., concurring)
(explaining that Batson overruled Swain's presumption immunizing peremptory challenges
against blacks in individual cases from equal protection scrutiny); United States v Broussard,
987 F.2d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting that Batson rejected Swain's interpretation of Equal
Protection Clause's applicability to race-based peremptory challenges). The Fifth Circuit
elaborated, "Th[e] view of peremptory challenges as not presenting equal protection
issues at all m a discrete case was rejected m Batson, at least for race." Id. (emphasis
added); see also United States v Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038, 1042 (4th Cir. 1988) (explaining
that Batson relaxed Swain's evidentiary burden m race context), cert. dismissed sub nom.
Washington v. United States, 489 U.S. 1094 (1989), and cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1069 (1990);
State v Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 768-69 (Minn. 1993) (describing Batson as limited excep-
tion to Swain), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994).
208. See Broussard v United States, 987 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1993) (arguing that
Swam standard governs exercise of sex-based challenges). The Fifth Circuit explained: "We
are persuaded that Swain is a sound accommodation of the interests of fair trial and interests
in selection free of gender bias. Experience has not taught us that Swain is inadequate for
gender." Id., see also Davis, 504 N.W.2d at 768-71 (arguing that Swain provides applicable
standard for equal protection challenges to peremptory strikes outside context of race). But
see Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at *36-37, J.E.B. (No. 92-1239) (arguing
that adherence to Swain in context of sex-based challenges is unwise).
209. See Broussard, 987 F.2d at 220 (refusing to extend Batson to sex-based challenges
because experience did not reveal pattern of sex discrimnation in exercise of peremptory
challenges); Davis, 504 N.W.2d at 771 (declining to extend Batson to religion-based chal-
lenges because experience did not reveal pattern of religious discrimination in exercise of per-
emptory strikes). The Minnesota Supreme Court explained that "[bjecause religious bigotry
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special attention that the Court gives to problems of race justifies a reading
of Batson that limits that decision to its facts.2 0 As a matter of policy, the
Court's continued recognition of the importance of the peremptory chal-
lenge21 supports a narrow reading of Batson that attempts to preserve the
balance that the Swain Court struck between the challenge and the Equal
Protection Clause.2"2
By focusing on the state's use of peremptory strikes m a single case,2 3
the J.E.B. Court erroneously departed from Swain's evidentiary standard.
Indeed, the J.E.B. Court extended Batson's reduced evidentiary standard
to cases of sex-based peremptory strikes despite the lack of any evidence
that states systematically use peremptory strikes to keep unbiased, qualified
women off juries; the Court frankly acknowledged that "[d]iscrmination on
the basis of gender in the exercise of peremptory challenges is a relatively
recent phenomenon."214 In other words, the J.E.B. Court provided a remedy
in the use of the peremptory challenge is not as prevalent, or flagrant, or historically in-
grained in the jury selection process as is race, we conclude that neither the federal nor our
state constitution requires an extension of Batson." Id. (emphasis added). The Supreme
Court, m Powers, Edmonson, and McCollum, did analyze peremptory challenges m individual
cases. Georgia v McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 44-46 (1992); Edmonson v Leesville Concrete
Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616-17 (1991); Powers v Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 403 (1991). But because
those cases only dealt with race-based challenges, they did not extend Batson beyond the race
context. See supra note 97 (explaining that post-Batson cases dealt only with race-based
challenges).
210. See Palmore v Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (explaining that courts give race-
based classifications exacting scrutiny); Korematsu v United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216
(1944) (describing race-based classifications as munmediately suspect).
211. See supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text (discussing Court's emphasis on
importance of peremptory challenge).
212. See supra notes 197-210 and accompanying text (discussing Swam's balance
between peremptory challenges and Equal Protection Clause).
213. See J.E.B. v Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1421-22 (1994) (applying
Equal Protection Clause to state's exercise of peremptory challenges m single case). The
J.E.B. Court did not discuss or mention Swain at all.
214. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422. In almost all of the vemre selection cases, black
criminal defendants alleged a pattern of discriminatory practices, supported with substantive
proof. See Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773, 774 (1964) (documenting discriminatory
selection practices). In Arnold, a defendant alleged that although 4,819 black men appeared
on county juror rolls and 2,499 black men appeared on the poll tax list, the county clerk could
remember only one black man serving on a grand jury in 24 years. Id. In contrast, J.E.B.
did not substantiate his argument with proof that sex-based strikes are widespread. See Peti-
tioner's Brief on the Merits at *7-16, J.E.B. (No. 92-1239) (arguing for extension of Batson
to sex-based peremptory challenges based on application of heightened scrutiny test and Bat-
son's harms analysis). Not only have litigants historically not abused the peremptory chal-
lenge in the context of sex, but the fact that J.E.B. used almost all of his strikes against
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for a problem that does not exist. The Court invoked the history of discrnm-
mation against women m the selection of vemres to justify its conclusion.215
But exclusion from the venre implies that the state has determined that a
particular group is inherently inferior and unfit to serve as jurors m any
case.2 16  Exclusion from a particular jury by peremptory challenge only
implies that a litigant has determined as a matter of trial tactics that a vene
member might be biased in a particular case. 217 The Court analogized the
history of discrinmation against women in venire selection to the history of
discrimination against blacks in venire selection and reasoned that the Batson
rule should logically protect women m petit jury selection m the same way
in whlch the rule protects blacks. 211 But this analysis ignores the fact that the
Court subjected peremptory challenges in a single case to equal protection
scrutiny when faced with evidence of abuse of the peremptory challenge -
and not when faced with evidence of discrimination in vemre selection.2 19
In the equal protection context, the Court has consistently treated discrmina-
tion on the basis of race differently than discrimination on the basis of sex.M
women and Alabama used almost all of its strikes against men demonstrates that the peremp-
tory challenge system does not discrimiate against either men or women - even m individ-
ual cases. See supra notes 165-76 and accompanying text (discussing Court's mistaken
characterization of peremptory challenge system as sex-based classification).
215. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422-27 Some lower courts have relied on similar grounds
in extending Batson to sex-based challenges. See United States v De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433,
1438 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (relying on history of exclusion of women from juries and
harms from state-sanctioned sex discrimination to justify extending Batson to sex-based chal-
lenges); Laidler v State, 627 So. 2d 1263, 1263-64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (explaining
that history of discrimination against women in jury service justified extending Batson to sex-
based challenges). But see United States v Broussard, 987 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1993)
(arguing that exclusion of women from jury service does not justify extension of Batson).
216. See United States v Leslie, 783 F.2d 541, 554 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (com-
paring effect of exclusion from venire to exclusion from petit jury), judgment vacated, 479
U.S. 1074 (1987); see also J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1437 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (comparing
reasons for exclusion of women from venire with reasons for exclusion of women from petit
jury). Justice Scalia noted: "Women were categorically excluded from juries because of
doubt that they were competent; women are stricken from juries by peremptory challenge
because of doubt that they are well disposed to the striking party's case." Id.
217 See Leslie, 783 F.2d at 554 (comparing exclusion from venire to exclusion from
petit jury).
218. See J.E.B. v Alabama e rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1425 (1994) (explaining that
blacks and women share history of exclusion from jury service).
219. See Batson v Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100-01 (1986) (White, J., concurring)
(explaining that evidence of persistent abuse in exercise of peremptory challenge justifies
partially overruling Swain).
220. Compare Palmore v Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984) (explaining that courts
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Choosing logic over experience is usually a poor way to make constitutional
law; as one court has written, "Ifthe life of the law were logic rather than
experience, Batson might well be extended to include religious bias and, for
that matter, an endless number of other biases."2 1
In fact, many lower courts have faced constitutional challenges to a
party's use of religion-based peremptory strikes.' Because J.E.B. con-
give race-based classifications most exacting scrutiny) and supra note 157 (defining strict
scrutiny) with Craig v Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976) (explaining that courts give sex-
based classifications intermediate or heightened scrutiny) and supra note 159 (defining
heightened scrutiny). A majority of the Court has never adopted the strict scrutiny test for
sex classifications. Compare Craig v Boren, 429 U.S. at 197-99 (applying heightened
scrutiny to sex-based classification) with Frontiero v Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682-88
(1973) (plurality opinion) (applying strict scrutiny to sex-based classification). Determining
the appropriate level of review for sex classifications is still an open question. J.E.B. v
Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1425 n.6 (1994) (stating that whether sex-based
classifications are inherently suspect is open question); Harris v Forklift Systems, 114 S. Ct.
367, 373 n.* (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (same).
221. State v Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 769 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2120
(1994). The Davis court was no doubt paraphrasing Justice Holmes's well-known aphorism:
"The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience." OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,
JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1923).
222. See Davis, 504 N.W.2d at 771 (declining to extend Batson to prohibit religion-based
peremptory challenges); cf. People v Johnson, 767 P.2d 1047, 1054 n.3 (Cal. 1989) (in
bank) (noting that Batson's applicability to religious groups is questionable), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1038 (1990); State v Antwme, 743 S.W.2d 51, 64 (Mo. 1987) (en banc) (explaining
that litigant's exercise of peremptory challenges is based on perceptions formed about
potential jurors and that Batson makes only race-based perceptions unacceptable), cert.
dented, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988); People v Kagan, 420 N.Y.S.2d 987, 989-90 (Sup. Ct. 1979)
(concluding, prior to Batson, that state's use of peremptory challenges to strike five venire
members with Jewish-sounding names did not violate Swain). But see Casarez v State, No.
1114-93, 1994 WL 695868, at *6-9 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 1994) (holding religion-based
strikes unconstitutional under strict scrutiny test). But cf United States v Greer, 939 F.2d
1076, 1085-86 & n.9 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating m dicta that Batson prohibits peremptory
challenges based on race, religion, and national origin), modified in part by a divided court,
968 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1390 (1993). Sitting en
banc, seven judges in the Fifth Circuit refused to address whether a defendant could strike
Jewish venire members because of their religion, 968 F.2d at 437 n.7, and seven judges
suggested that such strikes constituted an equal protection violation. Id. at 445-46. Some
lower courts have concluded that religion-based strikes violate state constitutional provisions.
See Joseph v State, 636 So. 2d 777, 780-81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (concluding that
Florida's exercise of peremptory challenges against Jewish venire members based on their
religion violated state constitution); cf. People v Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 761-62 (Cal. 1978)
(concluding that use of peremptory challenges to remove potential jurors solely on basis of
membership in cognizable group violates state constitution); State v Levinson, 795 P.2d 845,




cluded that sex-based challenges failed heightened scrutiny, strikes of poten-
tial jurors who are members of other classes entitled to a higher level of
scrutiny than rational basis - such as religious affiliation and illegiti-
macy 223 - may now also be unconstitutional. 4 In any event, a defendant
challenging religion-based strikes of potential jurors can rely on J.E.B. to
make a strong argument. In any given vemre, representation of religious
groups will most likely be proportionately small, so members of different
religions are not similarly situated.' Therefore, the peremptory challenge
system classifies on the basis of religion.' In addition, after J.E.B., mem-
bers of religious groups probably do not need to show any pattern of abuse
in the exercise of peremptory challenges.
Yet, last term, the Court declined to review a state court decision
refusing to extend Batson's protections to challenges based on religious affil-
iation. 7 Justices Thomas and Scalia, arguing that the principles of J.E.B.
223. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 504-06 (1976) (applying heightened scrutiny
to classification based on illegitimacy). The practical effect of an extension of Batson to ille-
gitimates is unclear. Religion, on the other hand, clearly does arise in the context of peremp-
tory challenges. See supra note 222 (discussing approach of lower courts to constitutionality
of religion-based strikes). In the context of religion, the Court has applied strict scrutiny
under the First Amendment's Establishment Clause to religion-based classifications. See
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244-46 (1982) (applying strict scrutiny to statutory scheme
preferring some religious denominations over others in granting exemption to registration and
reporting requirements for charitable institutions). Although the Court has never applied the
Equal Protection Clause to a religion-based classification, the Court's review of such classifi-
cations in Larson is at least comparable to its review of sex-based classifications under the
heightened scrutiny standard. Compare id. at 248-51 (requiring state to affirmatively show,
with evidence, that classification is closely fitted to advancing state's interest) with Craig v
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199-210 (1976) (requiring state to prove, with strong evidence, that
classification substantially furthers state interest).
224. See Dave Harbeck, Elimnating Unconstitutional Junes: Applying United States v
De Gross to All Heightened Scrutiny Equal Protection Groups in the Exercise of Peremptory
Challenges, 77 MINN. L. REV. 689, 710-15 (1993) (arguing that Court should extend Batson's
protections to groups subject to heightened scrutiny).
225. See supra notes 165-76 and accompanying text (arguing that peremptory challenge
system does not classify on basis of gender because of proportional representation in popula-
tion).
226. See supra notes 154-163 and accompanying text (discussing classifications).
227 See State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Minn. 1993) (refusing to extend Batson
to religion-based peremptory challenges), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994). Davis
involved the state's use of a peremptory challenge against a potential juror because the juror
was a Jehovah's Witness and therefore "reluctant to exercise authority over [his] fellow
human beings in [the] Court House." Id. at 768 (quoting prosecutor at trial). The Court also
denied certiorari in several cases involving sex-based peremptory challenges before finally
deciding J.E.B., see supra note 90 (citing cases involving sex-based challenges where Court
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required extending Batson to religion-based strikes, dissented from the denial
of certiorari. Their argument is quite strong because the Court has never
attempted to limit Batson to race-based strikes and has permitted peremp-
tory challenges based on national origin or ethnicity, the other two suspect
classes. 9  This area of peremptory challenge case law clearly remains a
possibility for future extensions of Batson.
In sum, J.E.B. represents the Court's wooden application of constitu-
tional principles developed in the race context to the sex context, with little
thought given to the policies underlying the principles. Because the J.E.B.
Court chose logic over experience, the Court created a remedy for a problem
that existed only m the Court's opinion. The result will be an expansion of
the already enormous scope of peremptory challenge litigation and a
further erosion of the peremptory challenge as an important tool for litigants
m the courtroom.
V A New Approach
Peremptory challenges have a pedigree that predates English common
law " Prior to Swain, however, the Supreme Court paid scant attention to
demed certiorari), so the denial m this case does not necessarily mean that the Court will not
address religion-based strikes m the future.
228. Minnesota v Davis, 114 S. Ct. 2120, 2121 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari). Justice Thomas explained:
J.E.B. would seem to have extended Batson's equal protection analysis to all
strikes based on [heightened scrutiny characteristics] [No rationale [exists]
for distinguishing between strikes exercised on the basis of various classifications
that receive heightened scrutiny
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
229. See Hemandezv. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 369 (1991) (plurality opinion) (arguing
that peremptory challenges based on ethnicity would constitute intentional discrimination).
Justice Kennedy, m his plurality opinion, explained: "We discern no clear error in the state
trial court's determnation that the prosecutor did not discriminate on the basis of the ethnicity
of Latino jurors." Id. at 369 (plurality opinion). By unplication, ethnicity-based strikes
would constitute a Batson violation. See id. at 373-75 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing
that ethnicity-based peremptory challenges constitute a Batson violation). Quoting Batson,
Justice O'Connor wrote: "Mhe Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge
potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that [Hispanic] jurors as
a group will be unable impartially to consider the State's case." Id. at 373-74 (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (quoting Batson v Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986)).
230. See J.E.B. v Alabama e rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1431 (1994) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (discussing effect of Batson on jury trials). Justice O'Connor explained that
"Batson imm-hearigs are now routine in state and federal trial courts, and Batson appeals
have proliferated as well." Id.
231. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIEs *354 & nn.u-x (discussing history
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the exercise of peremptory strikes. 2 Today, parties litigate endlessly over
peremptory challenges and raise Batson-type claims at every opportunity "
At the Supreme Court level, the topic of debate concerns the ongoing attempt
to reconcile the peremptory challenge with the Equal Protection Clause.'3
Many legal commentators also have attempted to resolve the conflict. 5
The simplest approach to the problem is to avoid the conflict by abol-
ishing the challenge altogether - a position strongly advocated by Justice
Marshalf2 and supported by some legal commentators. 7 Alternatively, the
Court could overturn Batson and permit litigants to challenge venre mem-
bers "arbitar[ily] and capncious[ly]."2 8 Ideally, the Court would overturn
J.E.B. and permit litigants to challenge potential jurors based on any charac-
teristic except race, national origin, or ethncity 23 The Court, however,
of peremptory challenges); see also Batson v Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 118-21 (1986)
(Burger, CJ., dissenting) (tracing history of peremptory challenges); Swam v Alabama, 380
U.S. 202, 212-21 & nn.9-29 (1965) (same), overruled in part, Batson v Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79 (1986).
232. See McCray v Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1118 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that Swain
is only Supreme Court opinion dealing with peremptory challenges), cert. granted and
judgment vacated, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986).
233. See J.E.B. v Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1431 (1994) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (explaining that Batson hearings in trial courts are routine).
234. See id. at 1435 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (explaining that Batson required consti-
tutional balance between Equal Protection Clause and peremptory challenges to tilt against
challenge in context of race); Swain, 380 U.S. at 244 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (explaining
that Constitution compels choosing Equal Protection Clause over peremptory challenge),
overruled in part, Batson v Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
235. See mfra notes 243-48 and accompanying text (discussing commentators' approach
to both preserving peremptory challenge and satisfying Equal Protection Clause).
236. See Batson v Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 107 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) (ad-
vocating abolition of peremptory challenges entirely from judicial system).
237 See Craig M. Bradley, Reformng the Criminal Trial, 68 IND. L.J. 659, 662-63
(1993) (arguing that states and federal government should abolish peremptory challenges);
Raymond J. Broderick, Why the. Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65 TEMPLE L.
R . 369, 399-423 (1992) (arguing that peremptory challenges do not advance fir trial goals,
are antithetical to pluralistic and democratic societies, are tools of discrimination in
courtrooms, and are repositories of insult, fear, and hatred); Brent J. Gurney, Note, The Case
forAbolishng Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trials, 21 HARv C.R.-C.L. L. REV 227,
244-56'(1986) (urging states to abolish use of peremptory challenges in criminal trials).
238. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *353 (discussing peremptory chal-
lenges). At least one commentator has advocated overturning Batson. See Cressler, supra
note 19, at 394 (concluding that Court should overrule Batson, Powers, and Edmonson).
239. See supra notes 213-30 and accompanying text (discussing inplications of Court's
opinion m J.E.B.).
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continues to reaffirm the importance of the challenge to trial by an impartial
jury,240 but simultaneously gives the Equal Protection Clause a broad inter-
pretation- " The Court, therefore, is unlikely to adopt any of these ap-
proaches.'
Most commentators attempt to deal with the conflict directly For
example, one commentator advocated modifying the number of peremptory
challenges that parties to a civil or criminal proceeding can exercise.24
Another scholar proposed an ethical rule that would govern an attorney's
exercise of a peremptory challenge. 2' Several scholars have explored
the possibilities of affirmative jury selection. 2' Another scholar suggested
challenging the use of peremptory challenges under the Thirteenth Amend-
ment.2'"
The most workable and effective proposal, however, is a modification
of the existing rules of criminal and civil procedure.A7 Other commenta-
tors have proposed new procedural rules governing how courts should deal
with peremptory challenges. 2' The following proposed rule would amend
240. See supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text (discussing Court cases that posi-
tively endorsed peremptory challenges and their function in system of trial by jury).
241. See J.E.B. v Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1430 (1994) (explaining that
core guarantee of Equal Protection Clause is that states will not discriminate).
242. See id. at 1429 (1994) (explaining that peremptory challenges exercised against
groups subject to rational basis scrutiny are not unconstitutional). In addition, Justice Black-
mun explained that challenges exercised on the basis of characteristics associated predomi-
nantly with one sex may survive equal protection scrutiny Id. at 1429 & n.16; see also supra
note 123 and accompanying text (noting J.E.B. Court's example of permissible peremptory
challenge).
243. See Hopper, supra note 39, at 836-39 (arguing that number of peremptory chal-
lenges should be linked to facts of case).
244. See Andrew G. Gordon, Beyond Batson v Kentucky: A Proposed Ethical Rule
Prohibiting Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection, 62 FORDHAM L. REv 685, 712-17
(1993) (proposing ethical rule to govern attorneys' exercise of peremptory challenges).
245. See Tracey L. Altman, Note, Affirmative Selection: A New Response to Peremptory
Challenge Abuse, 38 STAN. L. REV 781, 806-11 (1986) (proposing affirmative jury selection
system to curb peremptory challenge abuses); Hans Zeisel, Comment, Affirmative Peremptory
Jurvr Selection, 39 STAN. L. REV 1165, 1165-72 (1987) (discussing implications of affirma-
tivejuror selection, especially m capital cases).
246. See Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a
Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REV 1, 115-
25 (1990) (arguing that race-based peremptory challenges violate Thirteenth Amendment).
247 FED. R. Civ P 47(b); FED. R. CRIM. P 24(b). The Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure provide that 28 U.S.C. § 1870 shall govern peremptory challenges m civil cases. FED.
R. Civ P 47(b).
248. See Marko, supra note 38, at 128-30 (proposing model rule of criminal procedure
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Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(b); a similarly worded version would
amend Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 47(b). States also could adopt this
rule in whole or m part.
Amended Version of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(b):
(b) Peremptory Challenges
(1) Number
If the offense charged is pumshable by death, each side is entitled
to 20 peremptory challenges. If the offense charged is pumshable by
imprisonment for more than one year, the government is entitled to 6
peremptory challenges and the defendant or defendants jointly to 10 per-
emptory challenges. If the offense charged is pumshable by imprisonment
for not more than one year or by fine or both, each side is entitled to 3
peremptory challenges. If there is more than one defendant, the court may
allow the defendants additional peremptory challenges and permit them to
be exercised separately or jointly
(2) Limitations and Objections
(a) Neither the government nor any defendant may exercise a
peremptory challenge against a potential juror solely on the basis of the
potential juror's race, national origin, ethnicity, or sex.
(b) Either the government or any defendant may object to the
exercise of a peremptory challenge on the grounds that the challenge is
exercised m violation of subsection (a) of this section, provided that the
objecting party establishes a prima facie case.
(i) A prima facie case shall consist of evidence of a pattern
of peremptory challenges exercised m the case at hand against potential
jurors belonging to a group governed by subsection (a), as well all rele-
vant facts and circumstances surrounding jury selection, such as the
challenging party's questions during voir dire and the potential juror's
response to those questions.
(Q') Once an objecting party has established a prima facie
case, the court shall allow the challenging party the opportunity to rebut
the inference of intentional discrimination.
(iii) The objecting party is then entitled to show that the
challenging party's rebuttal is a pretext for discrimination.
for peremptory challenges). Marko's rule abolishes the government's peremptory challenges
and prohibits a defendant from exercising challenges against cognizable groups. Id., see also
Susan L. McCom, Note, Sex Discrimination in the Voir Dire Process: The Rights of Prospec-
tive Female Jurors, 58 S. CAL. L. REV 1225, 1254-58 (1985).(proposing model court rule
and model rule of criminal procedure). McCoin permits both the government and the defend-
ant to peremptorily challenge potential jurors, but she tailors her rule specifically to deal with
sex-based challenges. Id. at 1257 In addition, she allows venire members to raise a claim
of sex discrimination in a litigant's exercise of challenges. Id.
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(iv) The court shall then determine whether the objecting
party has proven intentional discrimination by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.
(c) All peremptory challenges not prohibited by subsection (a)
are presumptively valid, but the presumption of validity may be rebutted
as provided by subsection (d).
(d) Either the government or any defendant may object to a per-
emptory challenge that is not governed by subsection (a) provided:
(i) The challenge is exercised against a potential juror be-
longing to a cognizable group that is not governed by subsection (a).
(ii) The objecting party establishes, by clear and convincing
evidence drawn from a pattern of cases, that the challenging party exer-
cised the challenge solely on the basis of the potential juror's membership
in the cognizable group.
(iii) The challenging party is given an opportunity to rebut
the inference of discrimination and the objecting party is given an oppor-
tunity to show that the challenging party's rebuttal is a pretext for discrim-
ination. The court shall then determine whether the objecting party has
proven intentional discrimination by clear and convincing evidence.
(e) For purposes of subsection (d), a cognizable group is a group
that (i) is defined by a clearly identifiable factor, (ii) has a common thread
of attitudes, ideas, or experiences, and (iii) shares a community of inter-
ests such that the group cannot be adequately represented if the group is
excluded from the jury
(3) Remedy
If an objecting party prevails under subsections (b) or (d) of
section (2), the court shall order that the challenged potential juror be re-
called and impaneled, and for each juror recalled and impaneled, the court
shall reduce by one the number of challenges the challenging party has
remaining.
(4) Timeliness
An objection to the exercise of a peremptory challenge under sub-
section (b) or (d) of section (2) must be made at or before the conclusion
of the impaneling of the jury
(5) Recordation
The court shall make a record of the peremptory challenges as
exercised by the government and the defendant.
The existing Rule 24(b) would constitute subsection (1) of the proposed rule,
providing the number of potential jurors the government and the defendant
may peremptorily challenge. 249 Subsections (2)(a) and (b) codify existing
249. See FED. R. CRiM. P 24(b) (providing requisite number of peremptory challenges
both government and defendant may exercise in criminal cases).
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Court doctrines: Batson, Powers, Edmonson, McCollum, and J.E.B.3 The
rule prohibits litigants from exercising peremptory challenges based on any
strict scrutiny characteristic or sex. The test for a party to prove intentional
discrimination is essentially the same as the test that the Court established in
Batson, although the Court never explicitly imposed a preponderance of the
evidence burden of proof."1 The proposed rule includes tis burden to pro-
vide some guidance to the lower courts; however, because Batson hearings
are highly fact-specific, lower courts should have latitude to determine what
evidence is relevant when determining whether a party has established a
prima facie case. Finally, both criminal defendants and the government can
challenge the opposing party's use of peremptory strikes.
Subsection (2)(c) creates a rebuttable presumption that all other peremp-
tory challenges - those based on religion, illegitimacy, or rational basis
characteristics - are valid. Subsection (2)(d) revitalizes Swain and requires
a lower court to find compelling evidence of abuse of the challenge across
a pattern of cases before invoking the remedy in section (3).1 The rule pro-
vides a workable definition of "cognizable group" taken from a lower court
opinion. 3
Sections (3), (4), and (5) are procedural measures, partially adopted
from other proposed rules.' Section (3) is designed to deter abuse of the
peremptory challenge; by impaneling the challenged vemre member, the rule
should prevent litigants from exercising such a strike on one of the strict
scrutiny grounds listed in subsection (2)(a). Section (4) is meant to insure
250. See supra parts I-rnI (explaining state of law pre- and post-J.E.B.). Justice O'Con-
nor's proposed limitation of J.E.B.'s holding to the government's use of sex-based chal-
lenges, J.E.B. v Alabama cc rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1432 (1994) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring), is simply untenable because the Court did not adopt her approach to state action
in either Edmonson or McCollum. McCollum v Georgia, 505 U.S. 42, 62-68 (1992)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); Edmonson v Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 635-38
(1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In neither of those two cases did the Court base its finding
of state action on the fact that the litigants involved exercised race-based as opposed to sex-
based challenges. McCollum, 505 U.S. at 51-55; Edmnonson, 500 U.S. at 624-28.
251. See Batson v Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 (1986) (describing three-step process
for lower courts to evaluate state's exercise of peremptory challenges).
252. See supra notes 197-212 and accompanying text (discussing balance Swain struck
between challenge and equal protection doctrines). This subsection of the rule codifies the
doctrine that Batson is only a remedy that courts should invoke when experience demonstrates
that a remedy is needed. See supra note 206 (describing Batson as prophylactic device).
253. Murchu v. United States, 926 F.2d 50, 54 (lst Cir.) (defining cognizable group for
purposes of Batson challenge), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 828 (1991).
254. See Marko, supra note 38, at 128-30 (including timeliness and recordation pro-
visions); McCom, supra note 248, at 1254-58 (same).
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that lower courts have an opportunity to rule on Batson-type objections while
the events are still fresh m all the parties' minds. Section (5) requires that
the court make a record of which parties strike which jury panelists; this
record will facilitate any ruling that courts will make under subsections
(2)(b)(iv) and (2)(d)(iii).
VI. Conclusion
J.E.B. demonstrates why relying entirely on analogy and logic to make
constitutional law is often a bad idea. Although many of the problems of sex
discrimination are similar to the problems of race discrimination, this corre-
lation does not require the Supreme Court to treat both kinds of discrunmna-
tion in the same manner. In J.E.B., the Court ignored the Swain balance
and extended a rule (Batson) grounded in historical discrimination that
women have not experienced. Because litigants have not abused the peremp-
tory challenge system in striking women, -either historically or in J.E.B., the
Court's decision will cause more damage to the judicial system than it will
remedy
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